Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats

11. Urgency and Choice

THE VISION PUT FORWARD in this book will be difficult to achieve, and the opportunity to build the kind of order we describe is narrow. America ’s scope for forging a world based on responsible sovereignty was greater in 2001 than now and greater still in 1993. But America’s ability to lead is likely to be weaker in 2012 or 2016. Rising tensions between major powers and the prospects for confrontation are palpable. The global economic crisis could lead to rising demands for protectionism and the resurgence of nationalism. Should protectionism and nationalism derail international trade talks and climate negotiations, the reverberations will be felt in other areas such as diminished commitment to fight terrorism or control the spread of nuclear weapons. Lack of credible response to the gross irresponsibility of states, whether it be Sudan’s atrocities in Darfur, Myanmar and Zimbabwe ’s gross violations of human rights, or Iran’s quest for a nuclear weapon, drains confidence in the ability of international cooperation to deliver in the hardest cases. In turn, the longer it takes for international action to address such cases, the greater the chance that governments will turn to ad hoc, even unilateral, action, further undermining international trust and confidence. Nor can the impact of the global financial crisis be underestimated. As of fall 2008, it has cost trillions of dollars in equity value across the 302 URGENCY AND CHOICE ELEVEN 11-4706-2 ch11 12/15/08 11:20 AM Page 302 globe. Across nations tightened economic conditions may erode the political commitment and capacity to alleviate poverty and make the institutional investment to provide basic global public goods, let alone promote peace and stability. The fear of constraining growth will complicate negotiations on restricting greenhouse gases. To move ahead, leaders will need to focus on these measures as long-term investments and acknowledge that failure to make them will produce greater costs for everyone. But all of this—tensions among major powers, the economic crisis, demands for protectionism, irresponsibility of states, and lack of coherent , unified action in the toughest cases—are symptoms of the underlying problem discussed in this book. They reflect the volatility and dangerous perturbations when there is a lack of fundamental international order. They are the signs of international entropy and are harbingers of a much more deadly world to come. Together they warn that the task of fixing today’s transnational threats demands urgency. This means that American foreign policy cannot be complacent in rebuilding international order. The challenge cannot be met through incremental, business-as-usual, approaches. Faced with the daunting agenda we describe in this book, it will be tempting for policymakers to deny both the breadth and the complexity of today’s challenges, and hide behind dated mantras: “focus on one or two key issues,” “we can’t do it all,” “some things will just have to wait.” But take a look around: Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel and Palestine, Lebanon, Darfur, the global economic crisis, the rising influence of China, a reassertive Russia. Which one is supposed to wait on the back burner? And what about issues such as global warming, nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, avian flu, catastrophic terrorism, and preventing state failure? This is the world’s agenda, and it will come at policymakers with seeming lightning speed. The Obama administration must rapidly forge a negotiating position for the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen in December 2009. It must have a position for the next Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference in May 2010. A new administration’s actions in its first year may well determine whether the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization or a successor arrangement can be concluded. URGENCY AND CHOICE 303 11-4706-2 ch11 12/15/08 11:20 AM Page 303 Moreover, American foreign policy must resist the temptation to oversimplify a complex agenda and seek solace in old certainties. For too long American foreign policy has seen the world in black and white and searched for enemies. After the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, it took minutes before some commentators hailed it as proof the world was dividing into democratic and authoritarian camps, and that conflict between the United States on the one hand and Russia and China on the other is inevitable. The prospect of international order based on majorpower cooperation...