Power and Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era of Transnational Threats

8. Combating Transnational Terrorism

204 TERRORISM WAS A CONSTANT COMPANION to war and ideological struggle in the twentieth century, and at the start of the twenty-first, al Qaeda represents the most virulent form of the phenomenon the world has yet faced. Although the threat posed by terrorism has often been exaggerated , the prospect that a network like al Qaeda could gain access to a nuclear or biological weapon represents a serious threat to U.S. and international security. No state, however powerful, can defend itself unilaterally against transnational terrorism. Terrorist networks move operatives, money, and material across borders and through the crevices of the global economy. Only through extensive cooperation on financial flows, intelligence, and police action, and parallel action to reduce the social and political appeal of terrorism, can the risk be reduced. The most dangerous form of terrorism , involving nuclear and biological weapons, requires the most extensive cooperation. The struggle against terrorism rests on four facets of responsible sovereignty . Effective strategies to combat terrorism require states to (1) fulfill universal responsibilities not to sponsor, aid, or abet transnational terrorism; (2) take responsibility for the external impacts of conditions within their borders; (3) take responsibility for the well-being of their citizens , thereby diminishing the risk of terrorism; and (4) build adequate COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM EIGHT 08-4706-2 ch08 12/15/08 11:14 AM Page 204 capacity to implement their responsibilities. The capacity-building point underscores an important concept—that powerful states have an incentive based on self-interest, along with a positive responsibility, to assist weak states. If states want to create an international system that helps them protect the territory within their own borders, they need the cooperation of all states. That creates an imperative to build the capabilities of even the weakest links in the chain. As the victim of the largest terrorist attack in history and with its global reach, the United States should be the leader in cooperative efforts to combat terrorism. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the United States enjoyed support for robust action against al Qaeda from a broad coalition that encompassed all the major powers and much of the Arab world. The months after 9/11 also saw new energy at the United Nations, and in regional organizations, aimed at filling gaps in the normative, legal, and institutional infrastructure of effective counterterrorism. The war in Iraq, however, destroyed that unity of purpose. The rhetoric and tactics of the U.S. “global war on terror,” along with the illfounded justification of the war in Iraq as part of the fight against terror, have alienated the Arab and Muslim worlds and caused a loss of U.S. standing on the critical issues of human rights and democratization. The diminished standing of the United States has undermined counterterrorism efforts and the broader prospects for cooperative action against other shared threats. The credibility and capacity of global counterterrorism efforts will flounder without a policy shift in the United States. Going forward, U.S. policy should encompass a dedicated operational and diplomatic focus on al Qaeda and its related groups; support national efforts against various terrorist organizations, which in turn should be based on a lawenforcement and rule-of-law strategy and grounded in human rights; contribute to efforts to reduce the social and political appeal of terrorism ; and embed U.S. efforts within a robust framework for international cooperation against terrorism. Current international mechanisms to promote state and collective action against terrorism are comprehensive but not authoritative. State responsibilities are increasingly well articulated, through the now 16 UN conventions and protocols, UN Security Council resolutions, the UN General Assembly’s unanimously adopted counterterrorism strategy, and COMBATING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 205 08-4706-2 ch08 12/15/08 11:14 AM Page 205 regional declarations and conventions. Of these, however, only the Security Council’s elements are authoritative. Little has been done to develop effective mechanisms for building local capacity to combat terrorism or for supporting the development of national strategies. In addition, a proliferation of actors has led to a lack of coherence. There is no shared concept of enforcement. In the midst of this rather muddling performance by formal bodies, the G-8 has been a useful venue for promoting cooperation on tactical counterterrorism, in law enforcement and financing, and for spawning new, informal tools for cooperation, such as the Proliferation and Container Security initiatives.1 The work of the G-8...