-
3. Power and Institutions: An Effective International Architecture for Responsible Sovereignty
- Brookings Institution Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER based on responsible sovereignty will require a new U.S. foreign policy that seeks cooperation to mitigate transnational threats, invests in and strengthens international institutions to sustain cooperation, and signals its support for the international rule of law as the best guarantor of U.S. security and prosperity. It will also require a new U.S. leadership style that is based on consultation, listening , and openness to expanded participation from parts of the globe long ignored by the United States. This is only a start, however, for the United States is not powerful enough to refashion the international order on its own. A second requirement for international order is institutionalized cooperation among the United States, other major powers such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan, and rising powers such as India, China, Brazil, and South Africa. Why set a goal for institutionalized cooperation among these countries ? Because institutions are more than just devices for collective action: they are the infrastructure of order. They are reflections of underlying policy, but they are also mechanisms for shaping policy. When effectively designed, they allow states to identify and act on common interests, and in doing so, to build patterns of cooperation. And in their most crucial role, they can prevent direct conflict between or among the powers. 45 POWER AND INSTITUTIONS AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARCHITECTURE FOR RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGNTY THREE 03-4706-2 ch03 12/17/08 10:25 AM Page 45 U.S. allies and rising powers alike express intense frustration about their lack of inclusion in the negotiating and decisionmaking processes that affect their security and prosperity. Their agenda includes expanding the UN Security Council and the G-8 and reforming the architecture of international trade, finance, and development. Although these issues are fraught with conflict and potential pitfalls, the longer they go unresolved the greater the frustration at the growing chasm between the distribution of power among today’s states and the distribution of power within today’s institutions. Right now, if the United States or other leading nations were to seek to develop new arrangements for security, they would find only unsatisfactory options. The UN Security Council is sometimes effective, but often hampered by a lack of unity among the permanent members. By the time crises come to its attention, it is often too late to create consensus among its members. Nor is there any guarantee that all major powers will be present at any time; Japan, Brazil, India, and South Africa are not permanent members. Indeed, the council’s lack of representation has eroded its legitimacy. The UN General Assembly, on the other hand, has legitimacy, but its universal membership dilutes its effectiveness. The United States and other major powers could turn to informal mechanisms, but they lack the structure, predictability, and legitimacy of long-term solutions. Ultimately, this will have to be resolved by expanding the UN Security Council, but as we argue later in this chapter, this is the wrong place to start. Reforming the Security Council is difficult under any circumstances , and wrangling over expansion would detract attention from forging solutions to pressing transnational issues. Moreover, without shared perceptions and understandings among new members about today’s threats, expansion would just as likely paralyze the council as make it more effective. A mechanism does exist, however, that could forge patterns of cooperation among the major powers, including helping them to identify shared interests and understandings and build trust. Dissolving the current G-8 and creating a new G-16 that would include Brazil, China, India, South Africa, and Mexico (called the “Outreach Five”), along with Indonesia, Turkey, and one other country from Africa (likely Egypt or Nigeria), would create a means for the major and rising powers to construct shared interests and solutions to transnational threats. 46 AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL ARCHITECTURE 03-4706-2 ch03 12/17/08 10:25 AM Page 46 [44.203.235.24] Project MUSE (2024-03-28 12:28 GMT) It is easy to be pessimistic about institutional innovation at a time when many recent reform attempts have fallen short or stalled. Widespread disappointment about the outcomes from UN reform efforts in 2004–2005 was followed by poor performance from the UN Human Rights Council and a slow start to the UN Peacebuilding Commission. International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank reform has been halting. But a better understanding of the relationship between power and institutional effectiveness and a close study of lessons learned from the...