History Strikes Back: How States, Nations, and Conflicts Are Shaping the 21st Century

Foreword

Foreword In 1999 NATO blocked Yugoslav dictator Slobodan Miloševiç’s brutal attempt to expel much of Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian population from its homeland. The decision to intervene was made without explicit authorization from the UN Security Council and was condemned by critics as a violation of Yugoslav sovereignty. Because NATO acts by consensus, this humanitarian action could not have taken place without the support of French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine, and yet endorsing it ran contrary to some of Védrine’s strongest instincts. As a supporter of international law, Védrine was hesitant to undermine the prestige of the Security Council, which in this case could not act because of a threatened Russian veto. As a realist, the foreign minister was wary of moral outrage as a trigger for military action because he believed that self-righteousness and wisdom are often at odds—and that moral intentions are no guarantee of moral results. Finally, as a defender of Gallic pride, Védrine inevitably had qualms about an operation vii viewed by many around the world as a confirmation of America’s post–cold war leadership. So why did Védrine support intervention in Kosovo? The answer, quite simply, is that it was the right thing to do. Neither the United States, nor France, nor our other allies were prepared to stand by and watch as thousands of innocent people were killed or made homeless in the heart of Europe. NATO’s action served the cause of justice, saved many lives, and presaged an end to Miloševiç’s disastrous political reign. These beneficial outcomes do not mean that Védrine’s initial reservations about the operation lacked merit. Through the rigor of his questions, Védrine made clear that Kosovo should be considered an exceptional case, not a precedent for future actions. America had been given no general license to take NATO support for granted, rely too much on military solutions, or disregard the prerogatives of the UN. To avert bloodshed in Kosovo, Védrine was flexible in applying his principles , but he did not abandon those principles. A few years later, in Iraq, the types of concerns he had raised about the Kosovo intervention were wholly disregarded, at great cost to us all. During my years as America’s secretary of state (1997–2001), I never ignored Védrine’s perspective. Even if I had tried, he would not have let me. Hubert insisted on having his say, and whenever he spoke, he did so exceptionally well. Conversing with Védrine was like kayaking down a fast-flowing river. There was enough movement to demand concentration, enough excitement to keep spirits high, and enough danger to prevent complacency. As a result, he was my favorite diplomat with whom to disagree. viii Foreword Whether we were conferring in Paris or Washington, we rarely viewed an issue in precisely the same terms, but neither did we argue so strongly that communication became impossible. Védrine is an intellectual who is ever-conscious of the broad currents of history; I am more of a problem-solver who operates primarily in the here and now. I admired Hubert because he didn’t mince his words; he appreciated me because I replied to his words in French. Usually our exchanges focused on the crisis of the moment. On less urgent occasions we were able to deal more generally with the affectionate yet touchy relationship between our two countries. While I emphasized our nations’ shared interests, Hubert made plain his distress that the trend toward globalization was being driven by Anglo-Saxons. While I emphasized America’s agenda within the context of the Euro-Atlantic partnership, he was a fierce defender of France’s leadership role within Europe. When I pointed to Lafayette as an inspiration for Franco-American solidarity , Védrine smiled and replied, “Ah, but you see, chère Madeleine, Lafayette did not cross the Atlantic to help the Americans ; his motive was to defeat the British.” Now that we are both out of office, we still meet and speak but have found less to argue about and more about which to worry. In this decade, al Qaeda has emerged as a significant threat; the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have strained NATO unity; progress toward Arab-Israeli peace has stalled; environmental and energy challenges have been neglected; and the global divide between rich and poor has...