In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

American globalism requires a new script. During the cold war that script was motivated by grand theories of social change that failed to establish correlations between what actually occurred and what we had grounds to expect.1 Yet cold war perceptions of threats and opportunities were built so well into our culture that they are repeated by today’s policymakers.2 We are prevented from seeing gaps between our vision and the effects of our actions because we continue to base perceptions of our own security on models of containment that were originally designed to prevent the spread of Soviet power across Europe and throughout the third world. America’s cold war foreign policy was characterized by alliances with autocratic leaders such as China’s Chiang Kai-shek, South Vietnam’s Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Van Thieu, and the Philippines’ Ferdinand Marcos, to name a few. These alliances, ostensibly of mutual benefit, instead resulted in political and social instability and in failures to sustain economic development . The domestic failures of those governments dragged the United States into regional conflicts and two wars, in Korea and Vietnam, in the name of containing Communism. The U.S.-backed leaders considered in the case studies in Part 2 of this book overstayed in office without creating adequate public goods or social policies. They ruled personally and autocratically, creating neither parties nor bureaucracies to ensure a smooth succession nor policy continuity after stepping down. They eliminated secular opposition so that civil society never emerged or matured.3 They did little to create thriving, competitive economies. Nor did they provide equality, meritocracy, or upward opportunities for their people. They built armies based on personal loyalty rather 1 Economic Logic of the Alliance Curse 3 We have as our grand strategy only the arms race and the cold war. —John F. Kennedy, The Strategy of Peace (1960) than competence. Yet time and again, the United States overlooked these liabilities in its ambitious campaign to fight the spread of global Communism. When those rulers became targets of resentment by their own populations and fell, the alliances sent blowback to U.S. shores in the form of unanticipated threats.4 In some situations, violent anti-American policy setbacks created security risks that were even greater than those the alliances were designed to offset. Jihadism has emerged among those nations considered to be the staunchest allies against global Communism, as has the proliferation of nuclear weapons by Pakistan and state-sponsored terrorism by Iran. If, as has been proved through history, an alliance between a greater power and a weaker but strategically significant dictator traps the dominant partner into unnecessary conflicts and moral compromises, why has the United States forged so many such alliances since 1945? Why did regimes that are rated as highly corrupt receive a disproportionately large share of U.S. overseas assistance during the cold war? What drives democratic policymakers in the United States to support leaders who plunder their own countries, and why does the war on terror compel the United States to again ally itself with regimes that discredit America as a leader of progressive social reform? Are U.S. alliances with third world nations a possible contributor to global corruption ? Have policymakers misapprehended the underlying causes that may explain the correlation of aid and corruption? What remedies can be taken today to correct mishaps of the past? Consequences of the Alliance Curse Asymmetric alliances between first and third world countries are easily formed because in theory they appear to improve the well-being of both parties .5 The more powerful partner benefits in the short run, extending its political and military influence and gaining policy concessions such as cheap oil or UN votes that are appreciated by the home electorate. The weaker state gains a benefactor, as well as protection, aid, and abundant credit. But what may at first seem a fair and cooperative mutuality of interests invariably turns out to be unfair to the disenfranchised populations within the weaker state. Because the asymmetrical alliance may create a “development trap” and reduce the incentives of local leadership to govern for prosperity, the political status of already marginalized segments is likely to diminish as regime longevity increases. When aid from foreign taxpayers substitutes for domestic resources, the reforms and policy strengthening necessary for long-term viability can be neglected, leaving a recipient state with diminished social and institutional The Legacy of the Cold War 4 [3.16.66.206] Project MUSE (2024-04...

Share