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209 8 State Elite Perceptions and the Launch of the Israeli Settlement Project in the West Bank The International-Domestic Nexus Ehud Eiran Introduction On November 4, 2009, Palestinian Chief Negotiator Saeb Erekat stated that Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas should “tell his people the truth, that with the continuation of settlement activities, the two-state solution is no longer an option” (Assadi 2009). In the years following this salvo, Palestinian leaders stressed that ongoing Israeli settlement activity is the biggest barrier to an Israeli-Palestinian peace based on a two-state solution. For example, in an April 30, 2012 speech at the Tunisian Parliament , President Abbas declared his commitment to the peace process and to working together toward that goal with Israel’s hard-line prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. However, Abbas added that Netanyahu will need to “choose between settlements and peace.” Abbas reiterated that Israel needs to halt settlement activities before he would agree to resume negotiations (Issacharoff 2012). Indeed, between the fall of 2010 and the summer of 2013, the Palestinians refused to resume negotiation as long as settlement activity continued (Greenberg 2010; Ravid 2013). They agreed to go back to the negotiation table only under heavy American pressure, and when Israel committed to restrain settlement activity and to release a large 210 ▲ Ehud Eiran number of Palestinian prisoners (Ravid 2013). Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad explained in a speech to an Israeli audience on February 2, 2010 the logic of the Palestinian position, stating that “If settlements continue, the political question is how confident can we be that once relaunched , the political process will be able to deliver on permanent status issues” (Miller and Issacharoff 2010). Observers who agree with the Palestinian position suggest that the spatial expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank stifles the possibility for a future Palestinian state to emerge in that region. Moreover, heightened tensions on the ground between settlers, who along with their political allies are viewed as veto players and spoilers in this volume’s chapters by Spruyt and Haklai, and the indigenous Palestinian population have created new sources of conflict, further complicating an already complex situation (Mnookin and Eiran 2005; Eldar and Zertal 2005; Gorenberg 2006). Erekat’s statement summarized, then, the pivotal role of the Israeli settlement project in the West Bank in determining the outcome of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With the significance of the 350,000- to 500,000-strong settlement project1 in mind, this chapter proposes an explanation for its launch, linking domestic actors with the international milieu. As suggested in the introduction to this volume, leaders in democratic regimes navigate between domestic and international constraints and opportunities. Moving beyond the exclusive focus on internal reasons, as well as accounts that stress state-building or bi-communal factors such as social control (Lustick 1985, 1993; Weiner and Teitelbaum 2001), the following account focuses on the interplay between the domestic and international levels of analysis by highlighting the effect of the international environment on the Israeli leadership’s decision to initiate a settlement project. The chapter shows that while the decision to expand Israel’s borders was reached endogenously, the means to achieve this objective, through settlements, 1. The larger figure includes Israeli expansion in the East Jerusalem area, which Israel annexed and does not consider a “regular” settlement, but rather part of the municipality of Jerusalem. [3.15.5.183] Project MUSE (2024-04-18 10:14 GMT) The International-Domestic Nexus ▲ 211 was influenced by international factors. Israel’s launch of the settlement project in the first decade of its control over the West Bank was intended to manipulate the outcome of future negotiations that were to determine the permanent sovereignty of the disputed territory. This chapter demonstrates this argument through an analysis of Israeli elite beliefs regarding the role of the international system in determining the final status of the West Bank, and shows how these beliefs led to the adoption of a strategy of settlements as a tool of territorial expansion. The Settlement Project and the International Arena On January 23, 2010 Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu planted a tree in the settlement of Kfar Etzion, south of Jerusalem. On this occasion, the prime minister stated, as quoted in Haaretz, that “this place will become part of the state of Israel forever. . . . [P]lanting this tree here today carries great significance for securing this international status” (quoted in Levinson and Ravid 2010). The prime minister’s statement is a reminder...

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