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Elections and Parliament
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95 4 Elections and Parliament The PJD did not make inroads in the regime game. An alternative approach for parties failing in the direct regime game is to focus more on popular support and wait for better conditions in the future, such as an increase in their popular support to an extent that they win even flawed elections or a weakening of the regime for other reasons or both. Indeed, the introduction in this book argued that especially newly included groups with social movement support can benefit from electoral participation by reaching out to sympathizers or even new constituencies . Access to new resources and some, albeit limited, influence on policies can also accrue to opposition groups. In a monarchic system, even participation in a national government is within reach. At the same time, it is not a straightforward matter how opposition actors can maintain support and credibility when participating in flawed contests and powerless or delegitimized institutions. In Morocco, regime strategies toward Parliament and political parties have largely degraded the two as means of political organization and representation. MPs have a bad reputation for devaluing the party in favor of personal gain and corruption. This devaluation can take the form of “floor crossing,” or changing parties, for which Moroccan MPs are infamous . It also often takes the form of materially motivated voting with another party or for other parties’ candidates—for instance, when mayors are elected by the municipal councillors. Adapting to such features by involvement in political institutions, a process of “institutional socialization” (Putnam 1993, 36–38), would surely harm at least the support offered by the Islamist core constituency. In turn, participating in government makes the party responsible for outcomes without a real opportunity to implement its program. How the PJD dealt with these challenges, its strategies and interactions at the level of the representative institutions, and its approach to winning and 96 | Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes maintaining electoral support are thus significant elements in the story of its participation in the Moroccan political arena. 1997–2002: Establishing a Party Profile In the 1997 electoral campaign, the PJD, still under the name MPCD, began to establish its image of a party close to the ordinary people by employing a largely grassroots campaigning style. It focused strongly on door-to-door canvassing performed by MUR members, campaigning mainly on issues of social justice, morality, transparency, and authenticity. Its platform was “For a Total Revival. Authenticity—Justice—Development.”1 The party fielded candidates in 142 of the 325 constituencies, mainly in urban areas.2 According to the official—strongly manipulated—results, the PJD received a total of 264,324 votes (including the votes for candidates who did not win seats) and nine seats. The number of PJD deputies grew to fourteen until the autumn of 1999, when, after by-elections and the defection of two MPs from other parties, the PJD was capable of forming a parliamentary group. Of the original nine seats, four were won in Casablanca, and five in other large or at least medium-size cities, such as Tangier or Agadir. A number of the PJD candidates won large shares of the vote: al-Muqri al-Idrissi Abu Zaid and Mustafa Ramid in Casablanca districts as well as Saadeddine ElOthmani in Agadir and Amine Boukhoubza in Tetouan received around 50 percent . The remainder of the PJD candidates received more than 30 percent of the vote.3 Because of the high degree of electoral fraud, these results do not imply that the PJD did not have support in other areas. Assuming that the regime deflated the Islamists’ scores, the percentage of votes gained in these districts mean that the Islamists surely had substantial support in these areas. Critical Support In 1998, when the alternance government under Prime Minister Youssoufi was eventually formed, the PJD decided to lend that government its “critical support,” 1. The platform and the candidates’ profiles were published in al-Raya, the predecessor of al-Tajdid. 2. For the 1997 electoral campaign, see Tozy 1999a and Willis 1999. 3. The results are published in Tozy 1999a, 256. [44.204.164.147] Project MUSE (2024-03-19 05:32 GMT) Elections and Parliament | 97 a position wherein it essentially agreed to endorse the government’s policies in Parliament and not to mobilize against it. Prime Minister Youssoufi had consulted all the political parties and apparently had even offered a ministerial portfolio to the PJD (interview no. 7), hoping to face less opposition to the government...