The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus: Volume Two: Nationalism Versus Europeanization

4. Rising Ambiguities: The Competing Pulses of Peace and Conflict

72 4 Rising Ambiguities The Competing Pulses of Peace and Conflict F r e e M o v e m e n t : T h e U n e x p e c t e d a n d U n p r e c e d e n t e d E v e n t On April 23, 2003, shortly after the collapse of the Hague talks, an extraordinary event took place in Cyprus. With Turkey’s consent, the Denktash administration decided to partially lift restrictions on citizen movement across the green line—the 1974 cease-fire demarcation that over twentynine years had become a hardened ethnic boundary. Under this decree, TCs could travel to the GC south and GCs could visit the north, initially for only one day from 9 a.m. until noon, but, soon after April 23, for three days, including overnight stays. The announcement came as a great surprise to all concerned, and as a pleasant shock to GCs, whose longing to revisit northern Cyprus had long been impeded. The unexpected change was especially emotional for the thousands of GC refugees who had been forced to flee from the north, where their lives and history were rooted. Relaxing the restrictions to free movement also came as a great relief to TCs, who could now visit the south after decades of isolation and confinement . The international community was also caught by surprise, particularly the mediators who had formally abandoned the Cyprus problem following the collapse of the Hague talks. The historical and political question that naturally arises is why the Turkish side decided on this unexpected shift in policy on an issue that for years marked the cornerstone of its secessionist agenda. To anyone outside the narrow circle of policy leaders at the upper echelons of power, Rising Ambiguities | 73 the precise reasons and motives are not readily accessible, as objective observation is not possible nor reliable information available. However, in view of the historical significance of the decision, one is compelled to hypothesize as to the reason. A cluster of time-specific, interrelated phenomena may provide the answers. In the eyes of both the UN and the EU, the blame for the failure of the Hague talks—and consequently for not putting the Annan Plan to an islandwide referendum—weighed heavily on the Turkish side. Since the GC leader had agreed to put the plan to a referendum, albeit reluctantly, the Turkish side was left politically exposed. One can argue that this was not the first time that one side or the other suffered international political exposure because of its particular national policy decisions. However, conditions in April 2003 were radically different from all those previously encountered by the TC and Turkish authorities. The collapse of the top-level talks came as an overwhelming anticlimax for all who had invested hope in the UN-mediated negotiations. This was particularly true for the TCs. The experience again highlighted the marginalized political status of their community. Yet, this time it did so in a manner that was provocative, psychologically violating their longstanding sense of economic and political deprivation. In view of their anticipation for the long-awaited restoration of their international political status through a Cyprus solution and entry into the EU, the TCs felt that their leaders had failed them, even humiliated them. From a certain diachronic sensibility, it seemed as though the disappointing outcome of the top-level talks reawakened in many TCs the memory of siege, isolation , and entrapment they had experienced during the 1960s, when they lived in enclaves cut off from the rest of the world. Only this time, the major factor in their enclavement was not the GC-run Republic of Cyprus and the GC nationalist militias but the political entity and leaders that had been their protectors and guardians—namely, the TRNC, Denktash , and his political associates. As long as the key issue was whether to unite with the GC south, the TRNC, with all its shortcomings, still offered TCs a minimum foundation for security, identity, and political independence. Within the EU framework, however, particularly in an era of rapid globalization, the TRNC and its personification in the leadership 74 | Nationalism Versus Europeanization of Denktash began to be perceived as a restraint and even as an obstacle to TC interests. The domestic difficulties encountered by Turkey, combined with the negative economic impact that its economy had on...