The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus: Volume Two: Nationalism Versus Europeanization

Conclusion

260 Conclusion By failing to arrive at a final settlement in 2004, Cyprus became the first EU member-state to usher into the union an ethnically divided society. This has presented the EU with an unprecedented anomaly within its own political and legal edifice that stands in sharp contrast to its very principles and foundation. By 2007, many EU countries—even skeptics such as France, which had concerns about Turkey’s full membership— have concluded that it was a mistake to accept a divided Cyprus into the union (International Crisis Group 2007). With the complete absence of any substantive diplomatic initiatives since the failure of the Cyprus referendum , and with more urgent challenges within the EU as well as in the broader international arena overshadowing Cyprus, it was possible for the Cyprus problem to enter into a long-drawn period of inertia and stagnation with regressive effects on interethnic relations. Any scrutiny of the developments on Cyprus between the 2004 referenda and 2007 reveals that the effort to negotiate a final and comprehensive settlement had been forfeited by ongoing political squabbling and legalistic battles over issues that are peripheral or symptomatic of the unresolved Cyprus problem. This was evident in the stresses and strains that emerged between the Papadopoulos government and other EU members over his reluctance to engage the political dimension of the issue based on the UN directives. It was also evident in the complications and entanglements between Turkey and the EU over the unresolved legal dimensions still pertaining to its relationship to Cyprus and the Cyprus problem. While the legal aspects of the Cyprus problem continued to haunt Turkey’s EU accession process, its political aspects weighed heavier on the Papadopoulos administration. The complexities, antinomies, and Conclusion | 261 contradictions that emerged in practically every commission report and EU summit from April 2004 till the end of 2007 brought into focus two key facts: First, that there can be no alignment of the legal and political aspects of the Cyprus problem without a comprehensive settlement; second, that in the absence of a comprehensive settlement, the politicolegal contradictions and ambiguities in the relationships between the EU and Turkey, GCs and TCs, and Cyprus and Turkey are likely to persist indefinitely. As difficult as it may be for the Greek side to face, even as Turkey continues the illegal occupation of northern Cyprus, the Papadopoulos administration has burdened the GC government with an ongoing credibility problem—one that may persist beyond his presidency. This was evident in the fact that since the referenda, the international community and the UN have assumed a position of both disinterest in Cyprus and of strong reluctance to take Papadopoulos seriously when claiming after his rejection of the UN plan that he was still interested in resolving the Cyprus problem. GC opinion did not quite fathom that the wholesale rejection of the Annan Plan, led by Papadopoulos, amounted to the most spectacular rejection of the UN resolutions and directives in the problem’s history. Under the circumstances, bringing the Cyprus problem back on the path of a possible resolution hinged on whether the two sides, but especially the GC government, could genuinely convince the international community of their readiness to reengage in negotiations on the basis of the UN framework for an interethnic democracy. Only then would the UN, the EU, and the international community be moved to put Cyprus back on their agenda and proceed to reassemble the diplomatic infrastructure necessary to tackle the problem effectively. On February 17, 2008, the GCs held their presidential elections with incumbent president Tassos Papadopoulos, AKEL’s leader Dimitris Christofias, and DISY-backed EU parliamentarian Ioannis Kasoulides as the main contenders. As always, the Cyprus problem and the appropriate leader for achieving its resolution was central to the public debates. Not surprisingly, questions as to what exactly happened in the run-up to the 2004 referendum abounded: who did what and why; whether the GC side had handled the negotiations prudently; whether the GC leadership had acted responsibly in agreeing to hold the 2004 referendum 262 | Nationalism Versus Europeanization since it planned to reject the Annan Plan; whether the GC government had acted with transparency. Even Christofias openly accused Papadopoulos of clandestine decisions during the 2004 negotiations, of alienating the TC side, and of deviating from the long-held UN-based agreements for a bizonal, bicommunal federation. It was as though Christofias had been struck by...