The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus: Volume Two: Nationalism Versus Europeanization

6. The Cyprus Referenda: Nationalism Versus Postnationalism

139 6 The Cyprus Referenda Nationalism Versus Postnationalism T h e H i s t o r i c R e f e r e n d a o f A p r i l 24, 2004 The Greek government requested changing the date of the Cyprus referenda , as the original date of April 21 suggested by the UN coincided with the dark anniversary of the 1967 rise to power of the Greek military junta. The date was therefore moved to April 24. The separate, simultaneous referenda held in the GC and TC communities were unprecedented, as it was the first time in the history of Cyprus that GCs and TCs had been asked to participate directly in shaping the polity and future of their common homeland. Unfortunately, the outcome of the referenda, on the eve of the Island’s entry into the EU, was a great disappointment to all who had worked and hoped for a final political settlement of the Cyprus problem. On the TC side, 64.9 percent of the electorate voted in favor of the Annan Plan, while 35.1 percent voted against it. On the GC side, 75.8 percent of the electorate voted against the Annan Plan, while 24.2 percent voted in favor. It was historically telling that the two Cypriot leaders who felt utterly satisfied with this outcome were Papadopoulos and Denktash. Papadopoulos’s rejection of the plan had been fully secured and justified by the GC vote. Denktash thanked God for the GC “no” vote, as it fulfilled his aim of destroying the Annan Plan while simultaneously relieving the TC side of political blame (The Economist 2004c). In view of the enormous work that had been done—from the comprehensive UN peace plan to a new anthem and flag—the failure to conclude 140 | Nationalism Versus Europeanization the Cyprus problem at this critical and most opportune historical moment was perhaps the greatest political setback in the history of the Island since independence. The rejection of the plan by the GCs by a margin of three to one and its acceptance of the plan by the TCs by a margin of two to one appeared irrational and even shocking to outside observers. Yet, to those with insight into the subjective, political dynamics internal to Cyprus, the referenda could not have yielded anything different given the leadership of Papadopoulos on the GC side and Denktash’s eclipsing political influence on the TC side. How, then, can the results of the referenda be tangibly explained in view of the unprecedented convergence of historical and political factors bearing on the Cyprus process leading up to April 24? A long-term, time-sensitive study conducted by a group of scholars, combining expertise on the Cyprus problem and Expected Utility Analysis methodology, yielded interesting results that are relevant to the above question. The study was significant in employing state-of-the-art methodology to predict and analyze outcomes of the Cyprus negotiations and the anticipated referenda on a solution. The study used an agent-based model to analyze the political debate on the core issues of the Cyprus problem among all involved stakeholders (GC, TC, Greek and Turkish governments , parties, media, labor unions, various civil society organizations, and international agents such as the EU, UN, and United States). Moreover , the methodology combined game theory, decision theory (bounded rationality), risk, and spatial bargaining, providing predictions based on an explanation of how the policy positions of competing interests evolve over time. A series of studies over the years (Fall 1998; May 2003; December 2003; February 2004; March 2004) employing an Expected Utility Analysis methodology indicated that overall, the positions of the Cyprus stakeholders had started to gravitate toward agreement. Particularly in the study of March 2004, undertaken immediately prior to the referenda, the outcome showed an unprecedented level of convergence between GCs and TCs on all the issues with the exception of territory. On that issue, the study recommended direct contact between the Papadopoulos administration and the Turkish government, as the analysis pointed to the probability of arriving at consensus. Unfortunately, neither the Papadopoulos The Cyprus Referenda | 141 government nor Turkey heeded this recommendation. But even with the issue of territory left open and ambiguous, there was considerable convergence on all other issues. More significantly, this convergence coincided with the parameters of the Annan Plan (Yesilada et al. 2004). Interestingly, the methodology employed in the study had...