The Broken Olive Branch: Nationalism, Ethnic Conflict, and the Quest for Peace in Cyprus: Volume Two: Nationalism Versus Europeanization

5. Cyprus at the Crossroads: Nationalism of the Past Versus Europeanization of the Future

108 5 Cyprus at the Crossroads Nationalism of the Past Versus Europeanization of the Future R e n e w e d N a t i o n a l i s t T e m p t a t i o n s : N e w W i n e i n t o O l d W i n e s k i n Even as numerous steps toward rapprochement were being taken at this critical historical moment, with the EU acting as catalyst in creating and sustaining momentum, the hardcore nationalist traditions represented by the ruling administrations of the TC and GC communities remained a potent factor. Under the circumstances, to expect these governments to abandon nationalism in favor of reconciliation and a political settlement by either side would have been unrealistic. Though tempered by the EU process and modernizing social change in general, the nationalist mindset and behavior—albeit desperate and bewildered—persisted in the Denktash and Papadopoulos administrations. In many respects the significant peace-enhancing changes taking place appeared provocative and even disturbing to the nationalists in the two administrations because they disrupted the familiar conflict lines and rules of the belligerent, ethnocentric game they had become so accustomed to. The broad and unimpeded citizen rapprochement evident in the spontaneous mixing of the two communities, the 50 percent–plus popular vote among the TCs favoring reunification and the entry of a united Cyprus into the EU, and the continuing rapprochement between Greece and Turkey—all these trends appeared highly problematic to those still Cyprus at the Crossroads | 109 confined to the nationalist mentality. Under the circumstance, to the measure that the two Cypriot administrations continued to operate from a nationalist mindset, each faced the temptation of attempting to integrate the new historical developments into the old adversarial patterns. On the GC side, the Papadopoulos administration started to interpret phenomena such as the TC rush to the GC south for the purpose of securing passports not so much as a desperate and ardent desire by the TCs to attain EU citizenship, but as an entrenchment and even an endorsement of the legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus. The same rationale was evident as the administration succumbed to EU recommendations to accept the formal processing of TC products through the TC Chamber of Commerce and subsequently through the republic’s government for export to EU markets. Again, the Papadopoulos administration perceived this development not, as the EU intended it, primarily as a gesture of good will meant to facilitate efforts to reach a political settlement but as a political and legal validation of the status of the Republic of Cyprus. The Papadopoulos administration presented the positive outcome of intercommunal contacts as proof that the two communities could coexist and that separation was merely the result of Denktash’s and Ankara ’s secessionist policy. But because it refrained from voicing its position on the solution in light of the UN plan, the administration appeared to imply that the positive intercommunal contacts amounted to a first step toward reintegrating the TCs into the Republic of Cyprus—a move, it was thought, that would reinforce the republic’s legitimacy and continuity. The fundamental, yet unexpressed, assumption underlying Papadopoulos ’s nationalism was that the TCs would be gradually absorbed into the GC-controlled republic, thus, pending certain peripheral adjustments,a de facto resolving the Cyprus problem. The GC administration assumed that this process would in principle restore the republic while effectively dissolving the self-declared TRNC. Rather than seizing the rapprochement process as the civil foundation for the diplomatic pursuit of a final political settlement, the Papadopoulos administration was regressing to a nationalist usurpation of the process, particularly the part initiated by its government. The repeated impression projected by the administration was not surprising, given the hard-line 110 | Nationalism Versus Europeanization nationalist approach historically associated with Papadopoulos’s DIKO party. The impression was that propagating the political and legal status of the Republic of Cyprus in partisan nationalist fashion was more central to its policy than resolving the Cyprus problem in accordance with the UN federal model. If negotiations were to be pursued, Papadopoulos’s objective would be the restoration of the republic as close to its original unitary form as possible, and not the establishment of a new bicommunal, bizonal federation, as anticipated by all UN resolutions. From Papadopoulos’s perspective, the flourishing positive contact between GCs...