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Index 339 Abrams, General Creighton, 71, 125, 195, 300, 312n29; command abilities of, 310n1; and Easter Offensive, 243, 270– 271; and Hamburger Hill, 174; and One War strategy, 153–155, 311n15; and planning of Lam Son 719, 199; plans for 1969, 157; and prosecution of Lam Son 719, 205–206, 217–218; replaces Westmoreland , 153; and results of U.S./ ARVN I Corps offensive of 1968–1969, 152–153; and U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, 180–182, 194, and weaknesses of RF/PF, 179 Abrams Tapes, The, 174 Adkisson, Colonel George, 99, 104–105, 109; and Pham Van Dinh, 122 Advisers, 3, 8, 24, 26, 32, 38, 51, 56, 82–91, 143–151, 184–186, 213, 238–241, 251, 301; Advisory Team 1, 122–123; Advisory Team 155, 238; and ARVN fighting methods, 46, 81–82, 146–147; base camps, 144–146; battalion staff, 85; cannot accompany ARVN into Laos, 203, 216; and control of firepower, 85, 90–91, 203, 212; language difficulties, 86–87; nature of advisory effort, 84–85, 143; opinion of ARVN, 90, 185, 190–194, 307n25, 313n57; rations, 145; tour of duty, 87, 132n48; training, 86, 143; withdrawal of, 230–231, 240. See also Australian Army Training Team Vietnam (AATTV) Agroville Program, 23, 70 Andrade, Dale, 6, 252, 326n68 Apache Snow operation, 158–175. See also Hamburger Hill Ap Bac, Battle of, 28, 35 Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), 2–5; airmobility, 51–52; armament of, 41–42, 55; and Buddhist crisis, 59–62; and Cambodian Incursion, 197– 198; CIA report on abilities of, 180; complexity of, 298; and counterinsurgency , 22–23, 27, 32, 47; creation of, 22– 24; desertion, 23, 232, 238; detachment of battalions to districts, 77–78; draft, 23; and fall of South Vietnam, 278–280; family and, 40–41, 192, 232, 299; fighting methods, 41–43, 46–47, 149–150, 199–201; graft, 24, 39–40, 73–74, 80, 180; highlands battles of 1970, 186–190; historiography, 5, 25, 96–97, 298, 305n4; immobility, 236; initial military performance , 27–29; leadership qualities, 32, 56, 190, 209, 233, 271, 279–281, 301; loss of initiative to the NVA, 54; military situation in I Corps during U.S. withdrawal, 183–195; modernization plans for, 126–127, 231–232; morale, 49, 188, 191–193, 226, 233–234, 271; officer class, 18–19, 25–26, 44–45, 233; and overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, 36–38; pay, 39–40, 180, 232, 308n17; politicization of, 21, 24–26, 36–37, 47–48, 71, 78, 127, 178–180, 210–211, 218, 227, 236, 268–269, 279, 299, 301; relationship to U.S. forces, 8, 48, 67, 76–77, 87, 129– 133, 136–137, 155–156, 190–194, 199– 201, 210–211, 231, 251, 271–272, 300– 303; reliance on firepower, 23–24, 49, 85, 90–91, 147, 194, 199, 203, 211–212, 231, 271, 301; response to U.S. withdrawal , 181–182, 186, 230–233, 235; reverses in 1964–1965, 48; roots of, 19–22; situation after Lam Son 719, 229–230, 233–234; strength of, 6, 27, 34–35, 126, 231–232, 316n5; training of, 32; unready to shoulder the burden of the war after Lam Son 719, 227, 299, 302. See also Advisers ; Hamburger Hill; Lam Son 719; ARVN (continued) Pacification; Reeducation; Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF); Tet Offensive; U.S./ARVN I Corps offensive of 1968– 1969 Army of the Republic of Vietnam, units of: I Corps, 46, 48, 57–61, 66–67, 124– 128, 139, 141, 147, 149, 151, 154–156, 180–182, 190, 194, 200–201, 210–211, 218, 225–226, 230–231, 234–237, 242– 243, 248, 265–266, 299; III Corps, 75, 181, 186, 197; IV Corps, 213, 232; 1st Division, 4, 13, 32, 50, 52, 54, 57–64, 67, 88, 98–104, 106–107, 109–115, 118–122, 124–125, 131, 138–140, 147, 149, 151, 154, 171, 182, 191, 194, 201, 203–205, 207, 213–215, 226, 233–237, 241, 269; 2nd Division, 41, 67, 88, 236–237; 3rd Division, 226, 235–242, 244–245, 262, 265–269, 299; 18th Division, 279; 21st Division, 130; 25th Division, 236; Airborne Division, 200–201, 203, 208, 211, 213, 269; Marine Division, 210–211, 213–214, 223–224, 238, 247–249, 269; 1st Armored Brigade, 201, 203, 208; 147th Marine Brigade, 245, 247–249, 264–265, 267; 1st Ranger Group, 203; 1st Regiment/1st Division, 214–215; 2nd Regiment/1st Division, 214, 236, 244; 54th Regiment...

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