China: Contemporary Political, Economic, and International Affairs

4. Sino-American Relations since September 11: Can the New Stability Last?

4. Sino-American Relations since September 11: Can the New Stability Last? September 2002 david shambaugh A year after the devastating terrorist attacks on the United States, SinoAmerican relations are their most stable since they began their decade-long deterioration and constant fluctuation following the events of June 1989. The prospects for continued stability are positive as long as neither nation infringes on the core security interests of the other. Some would dispute this assessment, including many analysts in China, since they see limited benefits from post–September 11 Sino-American cooperation and continuing underlying tensions and frictions in the relationship .1 Of course, problems do exist and, given the fluctuant history of Sino-American relations, it would be a mistake to proclaim that the newfound stability is permanent or can endure indefinitely. Yet, the roller coaster of relations during the 1990s—when security tensions were frequent and disputes over human rights and trade were constant—is absent today. China’s support of the American war on Al Qaeda and global terrorism has certainly contributed to this new stability, but improvement in bilateral ties was noticeable before September 11 and is the result of more than simply cooperation in counterterrorism. Joint actions since September 11 have certainly contributed to improved ties, but this cooperation capitalized on momentum begun early in the Bush administration, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the April 2001 incident in which an American EP-3 surveillance plane was forced to make an emergency landing on Chinese territory. 51 1. See, for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, “11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations,” Survival (Spring 2002), pp. 33–50, and David M. Lampton, “Small Mercies: China and America after 9/11,” The National Interest (Winter 2001/2002), pp. 106–113. China’s Reaction to September 11 When the hijacked airplanes ploughed into the World Trade Center, Pentagon , and a Pennsylvania field on September 11, Chinese President Jiang Zemin watched the tragedy unfold live on CNN. Jiang immediately ordered his government to issue solemn condolences to the American people and to fully cooperate with the United States government’s efforts to track down the perpetrators.2 For his part, the Chinese president activated the dormant hotline to the White House to personally convey condolences to President George W. Bush (Jiang was reportedly the second foreign leader, following Russian President Vladimir Putin, to get through). Thereafter the Chinese government took a number of steps to offer tangible assistance to the United States: • helping draft and pass two key resolutions in the UN Security Council and General Assembly; • supporting, in principle, the coalition attacks on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (Beijing’s vote on Resolution 1368 marked the first time that China had voted in favor of—rather than its usual practice of abstaining from—authorizing the international use of force); • diplomatically working quietly behind the scenes with its close partner Pakistan to persuade General Pervez Musharraf’s government to support the war against the Taliban regime; • sharing intelligence with the United States on Al Qaeda and the Taliban; • initiating a series of exchanges with the United States on counterterrorism , leading to a practical working relationship in this field; • sealing China’s short border with Afghanistan to prevent Al Qaeda or Taliban fighters from migrating into the Xinjiang Autonomous Region; • inspecting bank accounts in Hong Kong and China for links to terrorist groups; • offering aid for Afghan refugee resettlement in Pakistan and some reconstruction aid in Afghanistan. China took these steps to unambiguously support the United States in the aftermath of September 11, but it has not done as much as other neighboring nations or other countries in the world. For example, China did not offer military overflight or basing rights—as did every nation surrounding 52 david shambaugh 2. Author interview with senior Chinese Foreign Ministry official, October 9, 2001, Beijing. Afghanistan (except Iran). China claims it has problems doing so because of longstanding sensitivities regarding sovereignty. Other nations, however, overcame such sensitivities and rose to the occasion. Nor did China commit any military units to the multinational force in Afghanistan. China’s reluctance to become militarily engaged in the Afghan conflict tarnishes its otherwise positive record in the war against terrorism. Even more troubling and mystifying is China’s failure to grasp the opportunity to contribute to the postconflict reconstruction of Afghanistan. China has...