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Chapter 6: The Twilight of Liberalism, 1969–1975
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The Twilight of Liberalism, 1969–1975 The embattled intellectual camps which had been formed by the end of 1968 provided the basis for a new intellectual diversity, which intensified during the remainder of the Vietnam era. However, intellectuals themselves frequently disliked this new diversity, and increasingly came to view it as part of an overall national decline. These camps shared several key experiences, most notably a new sense of powerlessness as intellectuals and a newly derived negative, or at least tarnished, view of America. For just about all of them, disillusionment replaced idealism. But their analyses and perceptions were so different from one another that one might question whether they had indeed shared the same reality. The truth was that intellectual frameworks had become so incompatible in the wake of Vietnam that each camp had, in fact, developed its own view of reality. The twilight of the Vietnam era’s intellectual essence revolves around the efforts of these disparate groups to come to terms with their own identities . By the end of the 1960s, each camp had reached an impasse with a particular intellectual problem or set of problems. The subsequent history of American intellectual life has been shaped in large part by the effort of each group to resolve these impasses. For the remaining liberal guard, the problem has been the achievement of the intellectual conciliation necessary to perpetuate the traditional values of personal and civil liberties in the context of international responsibility . In other words, a balance must now be struck between domestic reform and internationalism. Different subgroups within the old liberal ranks, specifically those discussed in the previous chapter—the democratic socialists, the counterculturists, the disillusioned liberals, and other independents —grappled with local derivations of the essential problem of legitimizing foreign policy in the context of pressing internal demands. 6 204 For the various camps, old and new, the specific intellectual problem of power remained important and virtually insoluble. For the most rapidly expanding of those camps—the neoconservatives and the conservatives —the quest for intellectual legitimacy consumed tremendous energy as proponents groped for positive notions to complement a philosophy born in reaction. The history of conservatism has been an inversion of the liberal problem: reconciling international activism with domestic passivity or laissez-faire, and asserting traditional values while remaining essentially antistate in persuasion. The issue of the Vietnam War, still at the center of American politics in 1969, all but disappeared when the direct American military role in the conflict ended in 1973. However, the new issues which replaced it were all products of the war, and all were characterized by a consuming sense of uncertainty. By 1973, most American intellectuals questioned the overall purposes of both foreign and domestic policies and philosophies. Various intellectual persuasions offered programs and rationales in an attempt to find solutions. The events of the Nixon years heightened tensions and disagreements among intellectuals and confirmed the transition from consensus to pronounced disunity. During Richard Nixon’s presidency, the role and selfperception of the American intellectual underwent a dramatic shift. With the exception of radical conservatives like William Buckley and James Burnham, who wanted to struggle on until victory was achieved in Vietnam , the vast majority of intellectuals, both liberal and radical leftist, believed that the electoral repudiation of a Democratic administration would lead to American withdrawal. Throughout the first half of 1969, for a variety of reasons, most intellectuals expected the war to end soon. Even the neoconservatives now called for an end to American military involvement . The intellectuals’ painful realization that this would not happen , despite their unanimous pleas, opened their eyes to their own powerlessness and seeming insignificance. And so the intellectual search for political identity continued. By 1973, many intellectuals were simply trying to define their relationship to the American people, who no longer seemed to give them much respect or attention . As the war ended, this introspection and soul-searching on the part of the intellectuals led to declining creative ability to focus on speci fic political problems and solutions, and to increasing drift toward general , abstract, and intangible matters. As the energy, confidence, and idealism of the early 1960s became a memory, the early 1970s were filled The Twilight of Liberalism, 1969–1975 | 205 [35.170.66.78] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 11:16 GMT) with questions. Faith in American exceptionalism reached its lowest point of the century, and apocalyptic thinking, for better or worse, gave way...