-
6 Value Pluralism, Autonomy,and Toleration
- NYU Press
- Chapter
- Additional Information
125 6 VaLue PLuraLIsM, autonoMy, and toLeratIon danIeL M. WeInstocK a number of political theorists have in the past few years argued that once the truth of value pluralism is established, the rejection of autonomy liberalism (aL) follows almost automatically.1 For some theorists, such as William Galston, the alternative is a form of toleration liberalism (tL).2 For others, such as John Gray, the conclusion to be drawn from value pluralism is even more radical. Liberalism must on his view be rejected outright, as it instantiates a particular set of values that rules even liberal toleration out of court.3 My intention in this paper is to show that the philosophical distance that must be traveled by these theorists in order to make good their rejection of aL is in fact much greater than they seem to think. My argument will proceed in three steps. First, I will propose some conceptual ground-clearing which will establish the terms of the debate between proponents of aL and tL. the core of the argument will be delivered in the second and third parts of the paper, in which I will show that at least some degree of autonomous decision-making is a necessary ingredient of the moral psychology most naturally affirmed by value pluralists, and that value pluralism is at most causally related to the type of social pluralism that a politics of toleration is designed to resolve. I will end with some reflections suggesting that the distance between aL and tL may at the end of the day not be quite as great as might initially seem. In order to avoid crippling objections, both 126 daniel m. weinstock need to make concessions to the other, the net result of which might be to blur the distinction between them altogether. I I take liberalism to be a body of doctrine and practice principally concerned with the rights that the state ought to guarantee against the possible encroachment of democratic decision-making, market forces, and individual malfeasance. disagreements among liberals often have to do with the question of why we have these rights.4 these disagreements as to the grounds of rights inevitably give rise to disputes concerning their content. autonomy liberals believe that the rights of citizens should promote autonomous choice and decision-making. they are motivated by an ideal according to which people should be able to reflectively endorse the ways of life around which they organize their existences. they should be able to articulate, and when necessary to revise, their conceptions of the good life, or at the very least to give uncoerced assent to the conceptions that have been handed down to them by tradition.5 toleration liberals on the other hand believe that autonomy is just one value among others. some ways of life are non-individualist, based on deference to established authority and respect for traditions , but they are just as valuable as those that emphasize the individual’s authorship or reflective endorsement of her own conception of the good.6 defenders of these two ways of defining liberalism disagree about the rights that the state should uphold. For example, in the area of education aL will tend to be skeptical, and tL will tend to support, an extensive parental right to educate children according to parents’ conceptions of the good, and to withdraw children from state-sponsored education that they see as inimical to these conceptions. they will tend therefore to be on opposite sides of the debates on cases such as Yoder.7 aL will be more inclined than tL to support measures aimed at defending the rights of “internal minorities.” It holds that conceptions of the good that limit the educational and professional opportunities of women, or that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, are not just “different ,” but wrong, and that, ceteris paribus, the state should step in to uphold what defenders of aL view as rights that would other- [54.152.216.170] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 16:50 GMT) Value Pluralism, Autonomy, and Toleration 127 wise be denied. Proponents of tL will tend to think that as long as people have the ability to exit a way of life in which their rights are limited, there is no wrong that the state ought to make right.8 examples illustrating the differences between aL and tL could be multiplied. What is important is that we be clear on what lies at the basis of these examples. aL is committed...