Moral Universalism and Pluralism: NOMOS XLIX

5 The Idea of Political Pluralism

95 5 the Idea oF PoLItIcaL PLuraLIsM WILLIaM a. GaLston Introduction: A Sketch of Liberal Pluralism We often use the phrase “liberal democracy,” but we don’t always think about it very carefully. the noun points to a particular structure of politics in which decisions are made, directly or indirectly , by the people as a whole; and more broadly, to an understanding of politics in which all legitimate power flows from the people. the adjective points to a particular understanding of the scope of politics, in which the domain of legitimate political decision -making is seen as inherently limited. Liberal governance acknowledges that important spheres of human life are wholly or partly outside the purview of political power. It stands as a barrier against all forms of total power, including the power of democratic majorities. the question then arises, how are we to understand the nature and extent of limits on government? the signers of the u.s. declaration of Independence appealed to the self-evidence of certain truths, among them the concept of individuals as bearers of rights that both orient and restrict governmental power. today, individual rights represent an important (some would say dominant) part of our moral vocabulary. the question is whether they are sufficient to explain and justify the full range of constraints we may wish to impose on the exercise of public power—for example, limits on government’s right to intervene in the internal affairs of civil associations and faith-based institutions. 96 william a. galston In a recent book, Liberal Pluralism,1 I argue that we must develop a more complex theory of the limits to government. In this endeavor , three concepts are of special importance. the first is political pluralism, an understanding of social life that comprises multiple sources of authority—individuals, parents, civil associations, faithbased institutions, and the state, among others—no one of which is dominant in all spheres, for all purposes, on all occasions. Because so many types of human association possess an identity not wholly derived from the state, pluralist politics does not presume that the inner structure and principles of every sphere must mirror those of basic political institutions. For example, in filling positions of religious authority, faith communities may use, without state interference, gender-based norms that would be forbidden in businesses and public accommodations. the second key concept is value pluralism, made prominent by the late British philosopher Isaiah Berlin. this concept offers an account of the moral world we inhabit: while the distinction between good and bad is objective, there are multiple goods that differ qualitatively from one another and which cannot be ranked-ordered. If this is the case, there is no single way of life, based on a singular ordering of values, that is the highest and best for all individuals. this has important implications for politics. While states may legitimately act to prevent the great evils of human existence, they may not seek to force their citizens into one-size-fits-all patterns of desirable human lives. any public policy that relies on, promotes, or commands a single conception of human good or excellence as equally valid for all individuals is on its face illegitimate. the third key concept in my account of limited government is expressive liberty. simply put, this is a presumption in favor of individuals and groups leading their lives as they see fit, within the broad range of legitimate variation defined by value pluralism, in accordance with their own understandings of what gives life meaning and value. expressive liberty may be understood as an extension of the free exercise of religion, generalized to cover comprehensive conceptions of human life that rest on non-religious as well as religious claims. this extension applies to groups as well as individuals. some shared cultural understandings go just as deep, define identity just as much, as do shared religious beliefs. they are equally entitled to deference—again, within limits.2 The Idea of Political Pluralism 97 there is a presumption in favor of this expanded conception of free exercise, and a liberal pluralist state must discharge a burden of proof whenever it seeks to restrict it. this standard for state action is demanding, but hardly impossible to meet. While expressive liberty is a very important good, it is not the only good, and it is not unlimited. In the first place, the social space within which differing visions of...