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1 Contingency in Obligation
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17 1 contInGency In oBLIGatIon BarBara herMan this paper begins with an exploration of a set of tensions that arise between some ambitions of moral theory and the role of morality in the regulation and construction of ordinary life. It ends with a conjecture about moral justification in a moment of radical social and constitutional transition, and a challenge to the view that when such moments are politically necessary they may be normatively discontinuous with morality. the route from beginning to end is by way of an account of various kinds of contingent obligations . the idea is that in coming to terms with contingency in obligation within morality we acquire resources to extend the reach of moral justification across the putative gap between morality and political necessity. an important strand of modern moral theory aspires to capture the connected standards of universality of rule or principle and the unconditional nature of obligation. this can come to be regarded as the source of an ideal of sorts: that there be universality in the content of obligation as well.1 our moral lives, by contrast, are run through with obligations that are contingent, in form as well as content, specific to here and now. We are answerable to moral demands that arise from evolving institutions as well from the vagaries of human life. one response from the side of theory might find our moral lives to that degree imperfect. I doubt that could be right. a different response would take the measure of the contingency as a challenge to the ambitions of moral theory.2 once 18 barbara herman we appreciate the many different ways in which obligations are contingent, where things genuinely could have been otherwise, it might be wondered how we could support the claim of objectivity thought necessary for the unconditionality of obligation. In some cases the answer is easy, but not in all. My plan is to approach the topic of contingency in obligation in the spirit of this challenge, examining contested claims from the bottom up. I regard the ways we engage with morality in both ordinary and unusual circumstances as providing data, and adopt the working hypothesis that some of the difficulties we encounter may have their source in the ambitions of moral theory, or in the way we interpret them, rather than in the facts of moral life. reversing the angle of inquiry can often reveal occluded aspects of things; in this case, one hoped-for effect of the shift is some increased insight into the conditions that can give rise to moral obligations. some of the questions I will consider may appear more empirical than philosophical. this oddity of method is appropriate to the subject: ethics is a boundary discipline, beholden both to its internal standards (of correctness in judgment and action) as well as to the conditions of the practical world it orders. this can leave it open, in particular cases, to contest which sort of question we ought to be asking. consider, in this light, an initial piece of data and the consequences that flow from it for moral theory. Knowing in advance where our obligations lie, what claims of duty we may encounter, is not just practically useful for planning, but essential—arguably necessary—for living a coherent life.3 If compelling moral demands , personal or impersonal, may be lying in wait for us around any corner, we would have to set ourselves to anticipate and manage them; and if we cannot know in advance what they are, it is reasonable to think even the best of us would be rendered less able to invest ourselves, our energy, and attention in the projects and relationships that make life worthwhile. a great deal of practical uncertainty of any sort tends to be bad for us; moral uncertainty is especially problematic because moral demands, when they do show up, can override other concerns. this fact, on its own, pushes moral life to be conservative, resistant to change. and because most of us live locally, embedded in complex social and institutional networks, the conservative content of morality that we [44.211.35.130] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 08:00 GMT) Contingency in Obligation 19 encounter will also often be local: promises are to be made this way, help to be offered like that. these features of moral life—that it resists change and has a local face—have other sources as well. Morality is important in and to our lives: it is to...