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230 > 231 for both political engagement and political incorporation as illustrated in the New York context (see Mollenkopf, this volume). We argue that in the current Amsterdam context, group-based resources have a double and opposite effect on two important dimensions of political incorporation ; they stimulate political participation (because in Amsterdam it pays off for immigrant groups to mobilize and act collectively), but frustrate the attainment of influential positions for immigrant groups. Amsterdam political parties are crucial in understanding the negative effect of group-based resources on political incorporation. Using groupbased resources is interpreted by the political parties as a form of ethnic politics, which is increasingly seen as highly problematic. Therefore individuals and groups who use group-based resources for political purposes , or those group-based resources which parties expect them to use, are frustrated in getting more influential political positions. In order to explain the influential political position of some individuals of immigrant background, the political visibility of the group they belong to—as well as their individual skills as politicians and public administrators—are important. Political visibility, or the extent to which the immigrant group is visible in public debates (in a negative way), leads to increased political attention, which eventually provides more opportunities for individuals from that immigrant group to gain influential political positions (especially when the individuals do not have a strong link, or presumed link, with an ethnic constituency). So the Amsterdam paradox is that groups with many group-based resources have higher rates of political participation, because of a receptive institutional environment, but at the same time have a more difficult time becoming politically influential because the established political elite evaluates ethnic politics as problematic and undesirable. By the same token, immigrant groups with fewer group-based resources, but which are seen by the public and eventually by the political parties as problematic, will get more attention, which can lead to more opportunities for some individuals of that group to gain political influence, even if the group itself has relatively low rates of political participation. This chapter elaborates these points, beginning with background information on Surinamese, Turkish, and Moroccan immigrants in Amsterdam. It then examines the extent to which the three groups have been able to achieve political positions and influence. This is followed [18.219.22.169] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 11:59 GMT) 232 > 233 Both Turks and Moroccans arrived as (mainly male) guest workers in the late 1960s to take up low-skilled jobs in Amsterdam’s heavy industry . After the economic crisis of the early 1970s, many became unemployed . At the same time, many sent for their families to join them. As a result of family reunification, both groups grew rapidly over the next decades. Moroccans now represent about 9 percent of Amsterdam’s population, and Turks about 5 percent. Both groups are predominantly Muslim, making them a minority in a highly secular city and in a country where Islam is more and more cast in a negative light (Tillie 2008; see Uitermark, Duyvendak, and Rath, this volume). In public debates, Moroccans feature more visibly, being viewed as the most problematic minority group in Amsterdam. The media have constantly focused on negative incidents involving Moroccans and negative features of the Moroccan community: for instance, riots in the late 1990s between second -generation Moroccans and the police in an immigrant neighborhood , criminal activities like youth gangs, robberies, and other forms of petty theft involving people of Moroccan origin (Bovenkerk 2009), and the fact that filmmaker Theo van Gogh’s murder in 2004 was carried out by a Dutch national of Moroccan descent. Headlines in newspapers and reports on television have stigmatized Moroccans, giving rise to labels such as criminals, problem youth, and religious extremists. One could argue that Moroccan immigrants have taken over the marginal position occupied by Surinamese in the 1970s. Indeed, Moroccans are presently the largest yet also the poorest immigrant minority group in the city (see table 8.1). Size of immigrant group (2010) % of Amsterdam population (2010) Unemployment % (2007) Average monthly family income in euros (2005) Surinamese 68,881 9.0 9.7 1,700 Turks 40,370 5.3 12.1 1,550 Moroccans 69,439 9.0 11.8 1,310 Dutch 385,009 50.1 4.3 2,180 Table 8.1. Characteristics of the Largest Immigrant Groups in Amsterdam Note: The term “immigrant groups” includes those in the first and second generation. Sources: O+S (2008, 2010). 234 > 235 while the...

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