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>> 203 7 The Rise of Immigrant Influence in New York City Politics John Mollenkopf Introduction While we have known that immigrants and their children have made up a majority of New York City’s residents since the Federal Government ’s Current Population Survey (CPS) began to collect data on parents ’ place of birth in 1994, it may come as a surprise that they are now approaching a majority of its voting-age citizens as well. The November 2008 CPS indicates that 58 percent of the population and 48 percent of voting-age citizens are either immigrants or have at least one immigrant parent. (Native-born minority groups with native parents, such as African Americans and Puerto Ricans, constitute another 23 percent of the residents and 26 percent of the voting-age citizens.) Conversely, nativeborn whites with native-born parents, the nation’s dominant population and voting group, now account for only one in four of New York City’s potential voters and fewer than one in five residents. As a result, New York City constitutes an important laboratory both for how immigrants and their children become mobilized and represented within city politics (or not) as well as how those of immigrant descent interact with native-born minorities (and native-stock whites) in the political arena. Only a few other U.S. or Western European cities come close to this level of potential political participation by immigrant-origin voters. 204 > 205 [2001], and Smith [2003].) The momentum of the political order leads its main actors, including rising new groups, declining old ones, the major and minor parties, and various other organized groups with political weight (unions, business groups, religious institutions, and so on) to pursue well-established strategies, although groups may change these strategies in the course of implementing them. This momentum is embedded both in how the city charter and state election law define various governmental capacities and political processes as well as in the everyday interactions among parties, candidates, and interest groups. The strongly partisan nature of New York’s political system distinguishes it from American “reformed” cities (in which party candidates do not contend in local elections) as well as European cities (which have multi-party systems). New York City voters directly elect a strong executive (the mayor) separately from the relatively large city council (51 members). The mayor in turn sets policy, names department heads, determines the budget, and issues contracts (the last in conjunction with the city comptroller.) The main route to winning elected office (with the exception of the mayoralty) lies through a Democratic Party primary.1 Between the individual city councilors, who do not exercise much power, and the mayor, who does, are two other citywide offices, comptroller and public advocate, as well as five relatively symbolic borough presidents. The city council, public advocate, and comptroller have difficulty checking the power of the mayor, although the comptroller is also influential because he or she manages the city’s huge pension funds, must approve contracts, and audits city departments. Most assuredly, the key “precinct of power” is located at the mayor’s end of City Hall, not the city council’s end, nor across the street in the comptroller ’s office. Being a member of the New York City Council means belonging to a partisan hierarchy within which it is difficult to be an independent operator. Finally, party-related resources remain important to winning elections, notwithstanding the decline of party influence in urban America.2 While the candidate-centered resources that determine outcomes in nonpartisan elections, such as money, media visibility, and support from elite organizations, are also important, especially in mayoral races, they are arguably less so for lesser offices in New York, particularly because of the city’s generous public campaign finance system. 206 > 207 where the new population groups have been growing rapidly. Aware of the shifting ethnic composition of these districts, county party organizations have sometimes designated a loyal but appealing young member from the rising group to run for office while easing out an aging legislator (often by rewarding him or her with a judgeship). Sometimes, however, the county organizations have been slow to take such a step, the incumbent was unwilling to go, or the county organization wanted to slap down an insurgent, and the organization faced a real battle. Once in a while, the incumbent loses and the insurgent candidate wins. But unless there are enough other “reform” or “insurgent” legislators for him or her to join—which...

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