Cheating Welfare: Public Assistance and the Criminalization of Poverty

6 Engaging with Rules and Negotiating Compliance

118 | 6 Engaging with Rules and Negotiating Compliance If the interviewees in this study are at all indicative of general trends among welfare recipients, then breaking the welfare rules is the norm. Other studies have found that welfare recipients are often inadequately informed of welfare rules and programs and possess only superficial knowledge of sanctions (Fragile Families Research Brief 2002; Meyers, Glaser, and MacDonald 1998; Hasenfeld, Ghose, and Hillesland-Larson 2004; Kidwell and Gottlober 1999). Butignoranceoftherulesandpenaltiesisnottheonlyfactor.Thefamiliesinthis study generally could not survive on their welfare benefits alone or by following thewelfareregulationsandrequirements.Thisfindingisnothingnew:anumber of researchers have found that welfare recipients find it impossible to make ends meet on welfare (Edin and Lein 1997; Gilliom 2001; Seccombe 1999). The maximumaidpaymentavailabletoasingleparentwhohadtwochildren ,wholivedin Bayview, and who was subject to the work requirements was $626 in 1999, a figurethatroseto $645in2000and$679in2001.Thismoneywastoolittletosustain a family. Almost everyone interviewed overstepped the rules to feed, clothe, and shelter themselves and their children. The data in this study suggest, however, that rule breaking by adult heads of households varied, with a number of factors influencingthetypeofrulebreakingthatoccurred.Thesefactorsincluded • Knowledge of the system—including knowledge of the rules and regulations , knowledge of the sanctions for noncompliance, knowledge of welfare surveillance systems, and knowledge of the various benefits available • The availability of financial support from resources other than the welfare system • Human capital—including education, paid labor skills and experience, selfconfidence , age, and race • Attitudes about fairness of the rules • Degree of financial desperation Engaging with Rules and Negotiating Compliance | 119 Some interviewees were willing to accept the economic sanctions that accompanied noncompliance with the welfare-to-work requirements, while others feared sanctions. Some were willing to take risks with their welfare benefits if they believed the long-term benefits would outweigh the shortterm costs. At the same time, many of the interviewees did not accurately assess the risks of their noncompliance, unaware of the methods the welfare office used to detect cheating and the severity of penalties for breaking the rules. The term rule engagement, as used here, includes an individual’s knowledge of the rules; ability to obtain information about the rules; and willingness and effort to comply with the rules. From the data, several categories of rule engagement emerged. While the boundaries between the categories are not precisely clear, especially given that some individuals appeared to possess detailed knowledge about some welfare rules and regulations and less about others, the categories nevertheless effectively describe some of the significant differences between—and similarities among—the interviewees. The first three sections that follow describe the three labels that generally describe recipients—the Informed/Knowing Recipients; the Misinformed Recipients; and the Preoccupied/Disengaged Recipients. The later section of the chapter turns to how recipients understand the normative pull of complex rules. Informed/Knowing Welfare Recipients The Informed/Knowing welfare recipients interviewed knew the ins and outs of the welfare rules. They knew about the sixty-month lifetime limits on cash aid and knew when their limits hit. They generally possessed detailed knowledge about the reporting requirements, the consequences of failing to report income, and the methods the welfare system employed to catch cheats. Most of the Informed also regarded the system as a sham. Because they understood the rules and how the system worked, they also knew how to use the system to their advantage and avoid the pitfalls that might put them at risk of getting caught for their unreported sources of income. Informed recipients knew how changes in their compliance with the rules and regulations would affect their benefits and could therefore make decisions that took into account the economic effects of noncompliance. Some of these recipients were willing to accept the economic sanctions that accompanied noncompliance with the work or education requirements. For example , Tanya, a mother of three, was consciously risking a welfare sanction in order to pursue an educational program in alternative medicine, which she 120 | Engaging with Rules and Negotiating Compliance hoped would ultimately end both her reliance on welfare and her poverty. (California was a “work-first” state, where getting every recipient into a job, any job, was the top priority, and where welfare offices, with few exceptions, would not count educational programs toward work requirement hours.) Tanya was willing to accept the sanction against her welfare check because she believed the long-term benefits would outweigh the short-term loss of cash assistance. Unlike many of the welfare recipients interviewed, Tanya considered...