Was Blind, But Now I See: White Race Concsiousness and the Law

7. Notes on Doctrinal Reform

[7] Notes o n Doctrina l Refor m 1HE PROPOSED TRANSPARENCY-CONSCIOUS modifica tions o f Equa l Protectio n an d Titl e VI I doctrine s give rise to several jurisprudential considerations . First, they embody a mor e constructiv e discours e o f responsibility , i n place of the existing discourse of blame. Second, they implicate the problem of legal indeterminacy: If doctrine does not genuinely constrai n lega l decisionmakers , doctrina l refor m seems a n empt y exercise . Finally , th e projec t o f reformin g race discriminatio n la w ca n benefi t th e large r enterpris e o f constructing an antiracist white identity. Blame and Responsibility Both of the doctrines under examination here—the constitu tional requiremen t o f discriminator y inten t an d Titl e VIP s existing disparate impact rule—reflect a practice of blamin g "violators" fo r discriminator y practices . However , th e dis 129 Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1130 course of blame and punishment is not well suited to the task of racia l remediation . A n alternativ e mor e likel y t o hav e salutary consequence s i s a discours e o f responsibility ; tha t framework provide s a theoretica l foundatio n fo r th e doc trinal proposals that have been presented here. As I use i t here , the notio n o f "blame " ha s tw o compo nents : A n ac t i s blameworth y i f i t i s bot h morall y wron g and divergen t from norma l practice. Thus the constitutiona l requirement o f discriminator y inten t implicate s "blamewor thiness " insofa r a s it carries connotation s o f crimina l liabil ity : Heightened scrutin y i s triggered onl y i f ther e i s a "ba d actor" wh o ha s selecte d a cours e o f actio n because of it s adverse impac t o n nonwhites . In mainstream (libera l white ) discourse today , deliberatel y settin g ou t t o disadvantag e members o f racia l minorit y group s i s bot h morall y wron g and not the usual practice. It i s perhap s no t equall y obviou s tha t existin g Titl e VI I disparate impact rules participate too in a discourse of blaming . However, when one looks at the requirements for establishing th e existenc e o f disparat e effects , on e ha s th e sens e that the courts want to be shown that a particular employer's particular criterion of selection is the cause of a demonstrated disparate effect . Th e constellation o f requirements centerin g on actua l disparat e effect s an d tigh t line s o f causatio n ar e quite reminiscen t o f th e "intent " mode l o f liabilit y tha t i s embodied i n th e constitutiona l rule . I n thi s way , Titl e VI I does incorporat e th e notio n tha t lega l liabilit y i s to b e im posed only upon those who have stepped outside the bounds of accepted and acceptable practice. Blaming i s no t a n effective , empiricall y well-founded , o r Notes on Doctrinal Reform 1131 prudent wa y o f addressin g th e complet e rang e o f contempo rary manifestation s o f rac e discrimination . Th e ineffec tiveness of blaming becomes clear when one focuses attentio n on unconsciou s discriminatio n (o f which transparentl y whit e decisionmaking i s one form) . I n a simplifie d univers e o f onl y conscious an d unconsciou s discrimination , ther e ar e thre e plausible approache s t o assignin g blameworthiness : societ y might labe l conscious , bu t no t unconscious , discrimination , blameworthy; labe l bot h blameworthy ; o r labe l neithe r blameworthy. Brie f reflectio n reveal s tha t non e o f thes e ap proaches i s likely effectively t o addres s contemporar y Ameri can forms o f racial discrimination . The position that conscious discrimination i s blameworth y but unconsciou s discriminatio n i s not , i...