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CHAPTER 2 Ethnic Conflict an d the Euro-Atlanti c Community: The Yugoslav Crisis T HE REEMERGENC E O F nationa l conflicts in Eastern Europe and the successor states of the former Sovie t Union present s the Unite d State s an d it s allie s wit h stron g challenge s t o international peace . The immediat e consequence s an d longer-ter m implications o f such conflicts requir e European, Euro-Atlantic, an d international organization s t o adap t t o th e mor e difficul t demand s of maintainin g peac e unde r condition s o f economi c an d politica l transformation an d mobilize d ethni c identities. 1 Nationalis t de mands to redefine political relationships within existing states, establish ne w states, or redefin e boundarie s betwee n existin g states def y the traditiona l distinctio n betwee n interna l an d externa l conflicts . They involve many dimensions of human interaction and are subject to conflictin g interpretatio n b y outsid e actor s attemptin g t o dea l with their consequences. The solution of any one such conflict mus t be see n a s a potentia l preceden t fo r others , no t onl y amon g th e successor states of post-communist Europe , but i n the Third World and among the Western states as well. Several Wester n state s fac e o r hav e face d interna l challenge s t o their political unity based on regional ethnic identities. These experiences ar e inevitabl y reflecte d i n differin g view s wit h respec t t o ethnic conflicts withi n states , especially conflicts tha t cut across the borders o f states. The reemergence o f political diversit y among th e post-communist state s also contributes to policy differences amon g Western state s a s the y pursu e opportunitie s t o advanc e divergen t national interests. It is not surprising, therefore, that progress toward 43 44 I Ethnic Conflict and the Euro-Atlantic Community the establishment of a consistent, agreed set of principles for dealing with suc h conflict s ha s been slo w and tha t eve n agreemen t o n a d hoc responses to severe crisis has been extremely difficult t o achieve. International response s t o th e crisi s i n Yugoslavi a wer e domi nated by the great powers. Britain, France, and Germany, as well as the United States and the Soviet Union—later, Russia—played critical role s i n shapin g collectiv e response s t o th e crisis . Throughout , each o f thes e actor s pursue d it s own , ofte n conflicting , nationa l interests. Bu t the y als o acte d i n concert . Amon g them , Britain , France, Germany , th e Unite d States , an d th e Sovie t Union/Russi a dominated th e activitie s o f th e CSCE , the Europea n Community / European Union , the United Nations Security Council, and NATO; and throug h thes e organizations , the y influence d th e action s o f others. Som e Islami c states , fo r example , becam e increasingl y in volved i n th e crisis . Bu t thei r option s an d opportunitie s wer e se verely limited by the constraints impose d by decisions of the Security Council and the actions of the great powers. Thus, the legitimate authority to address the crisis in Yugoslavia through multilatera l institution s an d organization s wa s dispersed , while the influence an d resources to do so were concentrated in the hands of a few key states. This is an inherently weak and politicall y ineffective arrangemen t for crisis management. But the international community and particularly the Western powers were further ham pered by several factors: the rapid obsolescence of key principles of international orde r characteristi c o f th e postwa r syste m an d th e organizations develope d t o uphol d them ; th e a s ye t incomplet e process of articulating and establishing consensus around new principles for resolving conflict i n the post-Cold War system; and growing differences amon g the perceived nationa l interests o f the majo r...

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