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9 THE ARROW CROSS ERA The Szálasi Coup Shortly after the inauguration of the Géza Lakatos government on August 29, 1944, Horthy proceeded with his plan for the honorable withdrawal of Hungary from the war. The plan was originally scheduled to have been carried out on September 8, but was postponed while the regent’s closest associates, including Minister of Defense Lajos Csatay, tried to find a solution for a glaring obstacle Horthy himself had introduced: the regent had allegedly pledged to Hitler and Edmund Veesenmayer that he would inform them in advance about Hungary’s resolve to quit the war.1 In fact, of course, the Germans did not need any special communication from the regent, as they were constantly fully and accurately informed about every move of the Hungarian leaders by their many agents, among whom were numerous high-ranking Hungarian governmental officials. The Germans consequently lost no time in taking measures to safeguard the interests of the Reich. Despite Horthy’s machinations, Veesenmayer continued to prefer to keep him as the formal head of state but to prevent him from wielding any real power. He correctly concluded that Horthy not only represented the formal sovereignty of the Hungarian nation, but also provided legitimacy for the actions of the government. While opting for this course of action, he and the other agents of the Reich took a series of contingency measures not only to prevent Hungary’s planned volte-face, but also to assure the pro-German orientation of any future government. Along these lines, they provided special protection for the Arrow Cross leaders, whose arrest Horthy had ordered on September 16.2 SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny was ordered to Budapest, reportedly on Hitler’s personal instructions, to coordinate military operations in conjunction with General Friesner, the new commander of the German forces in the capital, and Otto Winkelmann, the Higher SS and Police Leader. SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem BachZelewski , the chief of the antipartisan units then stationed in Warsaw, was assigned to take command of all local police and SS units and to be in charge of Operation Panzerfaust (Operation Armored Fist), the military code name for the anti-Horthy drive. 181 182 Chapter 9 While under the protection of the Germans, awaiting a summons to take over power, Ferenc Szálasi was preoccupied with his plans for the future “Hungarist” regime. Among these was his grand design for the solution of the Jewish question in the country. (By that time, of course, only the Jews of Budapest were still alive in Hungary, aside from the labor servicemen.) In theory at least, Szálasi’s solution was less radical than that advocated by the champions of the Final Solution. It stipulated, among other things: Jews shall perform labor service for the nation inside the country; their treatment is to be determined by their behavior; their legal status is to be regulated by law; no difference is to be made between one Jew and another. When the war is over, all Jews are be removed from Hungary to a place to be determined by international agreement. The Jews are never to be allowed to return to Hungarian soil. Mixed marriages are to be annulled and everyone may enforce application of this right. Those who fail to do so are to fall into the same category as the Jewish spouse; in such cases the children are to count as Jews.3 While the Nyilas were biding their time, Horthy and his trusted advisers proceeded with their poorly concealed plans for the conclusion of an armistice. The pro-armistice faction of the Hungarian leadership, who hated Bolshevism even more than Nazism, finally came to the realization thattheWesternAllieswerenotplanningtheinvasionoftheBalkans.Neither were they planning the deployment of special airborne troops to Hungary, as Hungarian leaders had originally hoped. The Western Powers, it seemed, had wittingly or unwittingly consented to domination of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union. Horthy had no alternative but to yield. He accepted the Soviets’ armistice conditions on October 11 and initially planned to announce Hungary ’s withdrawal from the war a week later. However, for a variety of reasons, including the pressures exerted upon him by both the Nazis and the Soviets, he decided to act on October 15, catching all of his potential supporters off guard. The troops deemed loyal to him could not be brought to the capital, the Jewish labor servicemen could not be armed, and the workers promised by...

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