The Fall and Recapture of Detroit in the War of 1812: In Defense of William Hull

Introduction

Introduction Brigadier General William Hull waited patiently as the members of the court assembled. It was 10:00 Saturday morning, March 26, 1814. On trial since the previous January, Hull was accused of treason, cowardice, neglect of duty, and unofficerlike conduct stemming from his surrender of Detroit to the British during the opening campaign of the War of 1812. Hull firmly believed that his surrender was a decision based upon humanitarian principles: that by surrendering he had avoided unnecessary bloodshed, especially that of the men, women, and children who inhabited Detroit. He hoped that the court would accept his defense on these grounds. The court did not. As the verdict was announced, Hull realized that his plea had failed. He was acquitted of the charge of treason, not surprisingly, considering the weak ground on which it was based. Nevertheless: “The court in consequence of their determination respecting the second and third charges [cowardice and neglect of duty], and the specifications under those charges, exhibited under the said Brigadier General William Hull—and after due consideration, do sentence him to be shot to death, two thirds of the court concurring in the sentence.”1 How could such a sentence have been passed on a brigadier general and Revolutionary War hero—the only sentence of death ever rendered against a commanding general in the annals of U.S. military history? That the verdict was based primarily upon the hearsay testimony of militia of- ficers and men involved in the Detroit campaign, none of whom had any military training and who, as indicated in their testimony, were on a mis- Introduction 2 sion to malign the reputation of their commanding officer, would seem entirely unjust. One suspects that the members of the court acted in response to the deep embarrassment that Hull’s surrender brought to the administration of President Madison, then still struggling to justify the war itself. Hull was in his third term as the governor of Michigan territory when war was declared. He allowed the administration to persuade him to accept command of the newly created North Western Army, a decision he would regret his entire life. The president, Congress, and the nation itself were ill prepared to fight this war, which was primarily over the maritime problems that the United States had faced for several years: the boarding of U.S. ships, both those privately owned and U.S. Navy vessels, by the British Royal Navy; the British impressment of American sailors suspected of English heritage; and the requirement that U.S. masters purchase a license for continental trade. To declare war over maritime matters , though, would seem to be the height of folly. The nation’s miniscule navy was no match for England’s powerful fleet, then engaged in shutting down the flow of supplies to Napoleon. Congress realized the position it was in, but had determined that although England controlled the seas, the United States controlled the land, the land of North America. And the key to that land control was to take possession of Canada, whose trade England vitally needed in its war effort against Napoleon. Members of Congress had been gulled into believing, from the arguments of Henry Clay and the War Hawks, that Canada was weak and ripe for the taking . Westerners also were receptive to this argument, assuming that the conquest of Canada would eliminate another festering problem, Indian attacks on the frontier settlements that were prompted by British agents.2 However promising a land war against Canada initially appeared, the military soon discovered that it was an enterprise built upon a weak foundation—the use of raw militia. When war was declared on June 18, the regular army numbered only 5,260 men. This guaranteed that militia volunteers, hastily recruited, untrained in war, would do the bulk of the fighting in the war’s early stages. Their training would be conducted by officers who were themselves untrained and whose conduct too often was unsatisfactory and at times disgraceful.3 The Ohio militia, for example, would prove to be Hull’s undoing during the Detroit campaign. Originally the War Department intended to make a simultaneous three-pronged attack on Canada: at Detroit, the Niagara River, and Lake Champlain. However, it was at Detroit that the opening campaign of the Introduction 3 war took place, beginning in early June, months before the other two campaigns were under way...