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67 O Water Culture in Palestine ziad abdeen There are several objective differences between the water resources in the Palestinian sector and those in Israel. The most obvious one involves absolute quantities of available water. Israel currently has the upper hand in control of both surface and ground waters of the Jordan River watershed, including those areas in occupied West Bank. At the same time, water delivery infrastructure in Palestine is not as developed as it is in Israel. This means that water quality is not as high a concern in Israel as it is in Palestine. The discrepancy in both water quantity and quality is an important factor in the water culture of Palestine. The water consumption pattern by Palestinians is thus due in large part to political constraints. The most basic disparity between Israeli and Palestinian attitudes toward water can be traced to how much they receive, or per capita allocation rates. The average Israeli consumes roughly 350m3 /yr while a Palestinian uses roughly 100m3 /yr. In absolute terms, agriculture is a far smaller consumer of water in Palestine than in Israel. The Palestinian domestic/industrial and agricultural usage is roughly 89mcm for agriculture and 57mcm for the domestic sector. Ironically, this makes Palestinian agricultural a relatively greater consumer of water than the Israeli agricultural sector. Of course, the water management profile of agriculture in the West Bank is completely different than in the Israeli sector (see part 6). For example, irrigation techniques in the West Bank do not rely on capital-intensive drip systems, although this depends on the region and crop. Traditional Palestinian reliance on rainfall and streams, along with a lack of an irrigation-based agricultural sector, is considered by leading Palestinian experts to have ecological advantages (Assaf et al. 1998). Another difference is the relative contribution of surface water to overall resources. For example, there are some 527 known springs in the West Bank, providing roughly half of domestic consumption. As these springs historically were not regulated by the Israeli authorities, historic rights remained in force. Some 67% of these streams are utilized—roughly two-thirds by agriculture in the West Bank with the other third used for domestic purposes. The enormous magnitude of lost water to delivery systems has been documented in a number of contexts, with as much as 30% loss of local waters attributed to leaky pipes. While, theoretically, this problem falls in the technological rather than the social realm, expanding water efficiency in the municipal sector through investment in infrastructure is driven by social/political considerations. For example, the hesitancy of Palestinians to rely on Israeli technology can be linked to the general hesitation to allow for ongoing control and influence of Israeli sovereignty of water resources over Palestinian territories and resources. In general, the relative scarcity of water (both in terms of quantity and quality) in Palestine drives local perceptions and attitudes toward this resource. An additional factor driving attitudes is the traditional use of water in some villages in the West Bank. Where local control of water still remains intact, water allocations for agriculture are socially determined. Unfortunately, these systems are under threat as centralized authorities such as the Palestinian Water Authority begin to assume control. Further, the dominant role of political instability and the recent Intifadah within the day-to-day reality of Palestinians have enormous manifestations for the social dynamics of this society regarding water. In fact, it is a key element in the water culture of Palestine due to the perceived hegemonic position of Israel. While Israelis are vaguely aware of the geopolitical conflict in the area as a source of tension regarding water allocations, these issues are extremely high in the perceptions of Palestinian communities. The Oslo Accords brought with them a spate of public works projects, largely American funded, with the goal of strengthening the water infrastructure of the West Bank. Yet, due to a variety of factors, most of these did not change the conditions on the ground, and water scarcity only grew worse. This has surely not been lost on the Palestinian public. The impact of the military activities of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) on water infrastructure is frequently cited as exacerbating a situation that was already extremely deficient. The freezing of critical water infrastructure projects (e.g., the sewage treatment plant in Hebron or Sulfit) as a result of the present hostilities suggests that to a large extent there is justification for...

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