In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

143 Gatekeeping as Public Policy If we think of judicial gatekeeping outcomes at the state supreme court level as gatekeeping policy for the jurisdiction, we can step back from the narrow question of admissibility to the broader question of policy outcomes. How do we predict policy outcomes? This book adopted the perspective of judicial cognitive processes and the immediate case factors that may inform those processes. This is, however, only one starting point. The larger political-science question of predicting policy outcomes might also inform our analysis from several vantage points. If we are interested in the development of judicial policy or policy more generally, we can broaden our question and see how general theories of policy outcomes inform our expectations . This final chapter will move the discussion into additional realms of political science expectation. There are several broad theories of the policy process that may also do much to explain and predict judicial gatekeeping outcomes. There are also narrow expectations about additional particularized variables that might augment the above list. In the end, the idea is to step outside of the model presented in chapter 2 and examine other potential determinants of judicial policy outcomes in the gatekeeping context. Models of the Policy Process When attempting to predict a policy outcome, there are essentially four main schools of thought in the political science literature (Sabatier 1991): open systems theory, institutional rational choice theory, policy streams theory, and the advocacy coalition framework. Each of these systems would explain and predict policy outcomes differently, and they may have significant insights for understanding judicial gatekeeping decisions. New Clues? gatekeeping and the twenty-first century  c h a p t e r 7 Open systems theory (Hofferbert 1974) was developed to explain differential policy decisions across different states. Hofferbert explained policy outputs as a function of history/geography, socioeconomics, mass political behavior, government institutions, and elite behavior. These variables are visualized as a broad “funnel” (history/geography) narrowing to immediate political actions (elite behavior). In the context of judicial gatekeeping outputs, particular state history and government institutions might play an important role in the development and use of particular scientific evidence. State history is an important part of state political culture. The research in this book uncovered a regional difference in several gatekeeping contexts, which might have something more generally to do with historical political culture development. (It could also have something to do with public opinion, ideology, or other variables that vary by state and might also be rooted in historical differences.) Socioeconomic position, as a measure of state wealth, might also explain judicial gatekeeping policy. It could predict differences in judicial professionalization and training, as well as important differences in the budgets available for law enforcement and criminal defense—variables closely tied to the“resources”measured as institutional and organizational advantages in the analysis of this book. It might be interesting, however, to see if budget differences among different judicial districts (particularly prosecutor budgets or lab infrastructure allocations) are closely tied to gatekeeping policy decisions. The next factor in the“funnel”is mass political behavior. Theories about mass political behavior are less likely to factor into a gatekeeping decision simply because of its low public salience. Of special importance for the puzzle is the fact that salience is not likely to vary among publics in different states when it comes to scientific admissibility. One way that mass political behavior can be related to gatekeeping policy is in its relationship to the election cycle and the way that“law and order”politics might be influencing state politics at any particular time. This is especially likely to have an effect if gatekeeping decisions are being made in the legislative branch (see the legislative appropriation discussion below). Another way that mass political influence might explain variation in gatekeeping policy is if public awareness is particularly heightened in a particular state. This could occur because of a high-profile case. It might also occur as an interaction between the timing of a gatekeeping decision and the development of a cultural factor (such as the increased popularity of CSI, discussed below). Government institutions could be correlated in a variety of ways, particularly in terms of judicial selection procedures, as well as the high court structure within the state. A few states have courts of criminal appeals that are the courts of last resort for criminal cases. The institutional difference between a high court specializing in criminal appeals and a high...

Share