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While positive change didn’t happen overnight, within a year the Operations Group had a whole new energy to it. They were also much more productive. No, the work wasn’t necessarily more interesting, but the employees’ approach to it was dramatically different. In the end, attitude is everything, isn’t it? Chapter 47 NASA: A PROBLEM OF CULTURE Much of what happens in professional life is the product of “culture ”—organizational culture, to be more specific. These are the unwritten mores and values of an organization. You won’t find any of these rules in writing. You won’t find them in an organizational chart or the standard-operating-procedures manual. Yet, organizational culture is very real. It drives not only our successes, but our failures as well. Consider the case of NASA, an organization I have conducted leadership training for. NASA is well respected and has accomplished great things over the years. However, NASA clearly has problems with its “culture .” These were the findings of a much-awaited investigative report into the causes behind the recent Columbia disaster. Beyond the technical , mechanical, and space-related problems with the Columbia, much of the tragedy centered on NASA’s culture, which had gone unexamined for too long. These are some of the same cultural issues that were raised after the Challenger disaster in 1986, but largely ignored. • In many ways, the NASA culture discouraged scientists, managers , and others in the organization who were concerned about safety issues from communicating those concerns in public. According to the final report on the Columbia accident, meetings at NASA were tightly controlled by those in charge and information largely flowed in one direction—downward 100 MAKE THE CONNECTION from the top. The report also found that numerous employees at NASA had written e-mails expressing safety concerns but never sent them. When interviewed, these NASA employees said they were afraid of being ridiculed. • According to Senator Bill Nelson, a Florida Democrat, the Columbia accident was a product of a “lack of communication” and an “atmosphere of arrogance.” This wasn’t only Senator Nelson’s opinion. The report produced from the Columbia investigation found that many top-level managers at NASA were so concerned about the organization’s public reputation that they created an atmosphere in which any negative feedback was stifled for fear of hurting the organization’s image. • The NASA culture also apparently defined loyalty as going along with the status quo. This is ironic because under different leadership a healthier view of loyalty to NASA might have encouraged employees to raise concerns because of a deep commitment to the organization and a desire to see it be the best it could be. • It also seems the NASA organizational culture has been quite insular. Concerns expressed by those outside the organization were often ignored. There may have been a sense within the organization that only those at NASA could understand the challenges and pressures facing this highly publicized federal agency. My objective is not to pile criticism on NASA at this crucial point in its history. NASA’s culture problems are not unique to them. These are problems inherent in countless public- and private-sector entities. However , NASA’s particular problems present a unique opportunity for us to understand how organizational culture, even in an organization with top-notch professionals, can go awry. The message here is for all leaders, managers, and others to pay attention to the culture and not take it for granted. Certainly, there is no perfect organizational culture and no onesize prototype that fits all. However, when an organization discourages open, candid, and free-flowing information and communication, bad things are bound to happen. From every indication, that was a lot of the problem at NASA. Organizational Life 101 ...

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