Questions on Aristotle's Categories

Question Two

50 [QUESTION TWO Whether this Book is About the Ten Categories as about a Subject] t is asked whether this book is about the ten categories as its subject. 1. It seems that it is not: Since “to know is to understand (cognoscere) the thing through its cause” according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics ,1 therefore everything knowable has a cause; these ten do not have a cause; therefore, there is not a science of them. Proof of the minor: “a cause is naturally prior to that of which it is the cause”;2 but nothing is naturally prior to these since they are first; therefore, etc. 2. Second, “of one science there is one subject”;3 these ten are not one subject, since they are not definable one . Therefore, since this science4 is one, it will not be about these ten . 3. Third, there is a real science of the categories; therefore, not a logical . The implication is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. III of the On the Soul:5 “Sciences are divided as things ”; but logic is diverse from every real science; therefore, the subject of logic is diverse from the subject of any real science. Proof of the ante1 . Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 2 (71b 9–12). 2. “Whatever is a cause of a cause, is also a cause of the effect”; Liber de causis, prop. 1. (ed. A. Pattin, p. 49). 3. Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 28 (87a 38). 4. The context indicates that the science referred to is logic. 5. On the Soul, Bk. III, Ch. 8 (431b 24–25). QUESTION 2 51 cedent: first, since the metaphysician determines these , as is shown in Bks. V and VII of the Metaphysics;6 second, since these are things of first intention—proof: since it is impossible for any second intention to be essentially (per se) predicated of a thing of first intention; but these ten most general are predicated essentially (per se) of the things of first intention—for this is essentially (per se) true: “man is substance”; therefore, every science of these ten is a real science. 4. To the opposite is Aristotle, determines here about the ten most general ; similarly, the book is entitled Of the Categories.7 [I. To The Question] [A. The Status of the Question] 5. One reply to this question is that the ten categories can be considered in two ways: in one way insofar as they are beings; in another way insofar as they are considered by reason (ratio), or insofar as some property caused by the intellect is attributed to them. 6. In the first way the metaphysician considers them; for his primary subject is being qua being. 7. In the second way, they are considered here. For attributes (passiones) are shown of them which inhere in them insofar as they are the most general ; for example, of substance “to be predicated univocally”8 and “not to be in a subject,”9 and “it seems to signify this something.”10 Similarly, determinations about the other genera are made in such a way, insofar as they are divided into their own species, and these further into other , and there 6. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 7 (1017a 22–30) and Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 10–20). 7. The word used here is predicamentorum, which is the Latin title. For consistency ’s sake, I have chosen always to translate praedicamenta as categories, following the custom established by other translators. 8. Categories, Ch. 5 (3a 34). 9. Ibid. (3a 7). 10. Ibid. (3b 10). 52 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS is nothing above them which descends into them through division . It is evident that, insofar as they are the most general , this attribute exists in them: “to be divided into species ,”11 and “to have many subordinate species,”12 and “not to have a genus above them.”13 And if is determined here of some other attributes which exist in these most general , insofar as they are beings, this is not principally to the issue, but is to the greater manifestation of them insofar as intentional predicates. 8. But since these ten are not the subject of one real science, namely, of metaphysics, except insofar as among them there is a primary one to which the others are attributed, as it is held in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics;14 and insofar as there...