Questions on Aristotle's Categories

Question Forty-Two

319 [QUESTION FORTY-TWO Whether in a Negative the Subject Stands for Being and for Non-Being Indifferently] Indeed, whatever as an affirmation and negation , etc.1 ere, Aristotle assigns the differentia between contradictory opposites and all other , since in all other it is not necessary for one extreme to be true and the other one to be false. In these, however , it is necessary: Either, since none of the other is necessarily true and the other (aliud) is false; but in contradictory , one of the two (alterum) is true, and the other (alterum) is false; and in this manner it is said of simple, contradictory . Or since none of the other opposites is true or false since it is simple; and contradictories are complex. It seems more that the second sense is understood there:2 “Altogether, however, nothing is true or false those which are said without combination.” And all others which are said “without combination” are said to be “the others,” that is, than contradictories. And then it must be understood that a contradiction, of which speaks here, is not only in simple , although he principally speaks here about the opposition of simple , since perhaps a contradiction is univocally found in propositions and in terms. So perhaps it is not in other oppositions, since that is more intentional; for it is absolutely intentional. 1. Categories, Ch. 10 (13a 37–b 2). 2. Categories, Ch. 10 (13b 10–11). 320 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS Afterwards,3 it is added that although it is necessary for an existing subject that one of the contraries that lack an intermediate to be true of that , nevertheless this is not necessary for a subject that does not exist. But in contradictories , whether the subject exists or does not exist, it is always that one of the two is true about the subject and the other one is false; since whether Socrates exists or not, this is always true, “Socrates is weak,” or this , “Socrates is not weak.” About this, it is asked whether in negative , the subject stands for being and non-being indifferently. 1. It seems that it does . Since, if Socrates does not exist, this , “Socrates is not weak,” would not be true unless the subject stands for a non-being, since otherwise the sense would be “Socrates, who exists, is not weak,” and its contradictory , is false, if Socrates does not exist; and so two contradictory would simultaneously be false.4 2. It will be said to this that when a term supposits , not having many supposits––as a discrete term does––it is possible for such a subject to stand for non-being; but this is not possible concerning a common term. 3. Against this: it is posited that no man exists, this is false, “every man is weak.”5 [I. The Response To The Question] 4. For the solution of this question, it is necessary to know beforehand what is signified through the term and what are its 3. Cf. Categories, Ch. 10 (13b 18–20). 4. The two propositions that would simultaneously be false are: “Socrates is not weak” and “Socrates is weak.” 5. The argument is that if no humans existed, it would be true to say that “every man is not weak,” where the subject term, “every man,” is not a discrete term, or proper noun, but a common term. Hence, according to the argument, not only a proper noun, but also a common noun, must stand for a non-being. QUESTION 42 321 essential supposits. Since from this one must conclude for what the term essentially supposits for in the sentence. For in every affirmative or negative proposition, supposits for its essential supposits. And for this reason, perhaps mention will be made about this in the book On Interpretation ,6 where those (discussions> are more proper. [II. What Must Be Noted About The Properties Of Contraries] [A. Concerning the First Property] Indeed, contraries, etc.7 It must be noted that Aristotle posits four properties of contraries . 5. The first 8 is that “what is always contrary to good is evil, but to evil is sometimes evil and sometimes good.” This must not be understood only of those forms “good” and “evil,” since those are only among themselves contrary and evil is never to evil by reason of the form of evil; but of those things which exist under , since sometimes that which is...