Questions on Aristotle's Categories

Question Thirty-Nine

304 [QUESTION THIRTY-NINE Whether Some Contraries Lack an Intermediate] t is asked whether some contraries lack an intermediate . 1. It seems that do not : Since if some were such , then of them there would not be any intermediate in itself; therefore, they would be contradictories. Proof of the first implication: since if there were an intermediate in itself of them, then they would admit of an intermediate. Proof of the second implication : since a contradiction is defined in this way by Aristotle in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics:1 “Contradiction is an opposition of which there is not an intermediate in itself”; therefore, those which have this definition are contradictories. 2. Second, according to Aristotle in the text,2 it is necessary for contraries that lack an intermediate for one (unum) to be in receptive ; but none are such; therefore, etc. Proof of the minor: since of all contraries, when one of the two (alterum) is not in by nature, it argued in this way: it is not necessary that this be in receptive of , nor is it necessary for that one ; therefore, neither is necessarily in . Both singulars are true; therefore, the universal is also , since that universal is sufficiently arrived at in1 . Posterior Analytics, Bk. I, Ch. 2 (72a 12–13). 2. Categories, Ch. 10 (11b 38–12a 2). QUESTION 39 305 ductively through the two singulars; therefore, its contradictory , “the other one (alterum) is necessarily ,” is false. 3. Third, it is possible––if which are —for there to be motion among contraries that lack an intermediate;3 but while it is in motion, the mobile is under neither of the terms; therefore, it is possible for the subject to be under neither of the contraries that lack an intermediate.4 Proof of the second proposition: first, according to Aristotle in Bk. VI of the Physics:5 while it is in motion, the mobile is partly in the terminus from which and partly in the terminus towards which . Second, since if the mobile were absolutely in the terminus from which , it would not be being moved; since then motion would be beginning. If it were absolutely in the terminus towards which there would not be motion, since then motion would be completed. 4. Fourth, if it is possible for a change to happen among contraries that lack an intermediate, as is manifest, Socrates would change from health to sickness. Since there would be some end of the duration of healthiness in Socrates, let the last end be A, and the first end of the initial sickness be B. Thus either B and A are one instant, and then the same in one instant will be under two contraries ; or there are two instants; thus among those there is an intermediate time in which he is neither healthy nor sick. Therefore, those contraries are an intermediate, and so of all the others. 5. To the opposite is Aristotle.6 3. Cf. Categories, Ch. 10 (13a 19–20). 4. For example, odd and even are contraries that lack an intermediate. Thus, it is necessary for a number, which is the subject, to be either odd or even. When a number, however, changes (and hence is in motion) from being odd to being even, so the argument goes, it is neither odd nor even, since a thing that is in motion is between the two terms of motion. 5. Physics, Bk. VI, Ch. 4 (234b 10–22). 6. Cf. supra, n. 2. 306 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS [I. The Response To The Question] 6. It must be said that there are some “maximally distant in the same genus, of which it is necessary for one of the two (alterum) to be in a receptive ”;7 therefore, there are some contraries that do lack an intermediate . The implication is evident through an argument from definition (per locum a definitione), since, according to Aristotle, in Bk. II of the Posterior Analytics,8 the question “if it is” is not known demonstratively except through “what it is.” [II. To The Principal Arguments] 7. To the first argument,9 I say that “there is not an intermediate in itself” can be understood in two ways: either it is a negation of a mode absolutely, or it is a mode of negation . In the first way, it pertains to contraries that lack an intermediate ; in the second way, it pertains to contradictories and...