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253 [Question Thirty Whether the Species of Quality are Suitably Assigned] I say, however, that quality is that according to which something is qualified,1 etc. irst, it is asked whether the species of quality are suitably assigned. 1. It seems that they are not: No multiple has species; but quality is multiple, according to Aristotle in this text:2 “quality is of those things which are said in many ways.” The major is evident, since a genus is predicated univocally, according to Aristotle3 in the definition of univocals. 2. Second, there are only two first species of any one genus; quality is one genus; therefore, it does not have four first species . Nor do these species seem to be subalternate , since none is contained under the other. The major is proved thus: every division of a genus is made through contrary differentiae, according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the Metaphysics4 and according to Boethius in his book On Division;5 but “one is only contrary to one,” as Aristotle proves in the same in Bk. X.6 Therefore, there are only two first differen1 . Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 25). 2. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 26). 3. Categories, Ch. 1 (1a 7–8). 4. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 10–11). 5. Boethius, Liber de divisione (ed. J. Magee, p. 20; PL 64, 881D). 6. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 5 (1055b 30). 254 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS tiae divisive of any genus; therefore, there are only two species constituted through them. 3. Third, it is impossible for two species of the same genus to be predicated of the same ; but “habit” and “disposition ,” which are assigned to the first species, and “affection” or “affective quality,” which are assigned to the third , are predicated of the same quality, as of hot and cold and similar which Aristotle enumerates in the first and third species ;7 therefore, the first and third species are not two . Proof of the major: “every differentia according to its species is a contrariety,” according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the Metaphysics ;8 and contraries are in no way predicated of the same thing. The minor is also proved by reason: since the same quality according to its essence can imply the affection of sense, and so it can be an affective quality and can be easily or with difficulty moveable from a subject, and so it is a habit or a disposition. 4. To the opposite is Aristotle.9 [Question Thirty-One Whether the First Species of Quality is Habit and Disposition] ext it is asked whether the first species of quality is habit and disposition. 5. It seems that it is not: Since either these are two or not. If they are two, then there are not only four species. Also, not every habit is a disposition, which is contrary to Aristotle here and in Bk. V of the Metaphysics.10 If they are not two, then the conjunction is not suitably posited between them, since the conjunction is usually placed between diverse things, and their differentia 7. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 25–9a 27). 8. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 17–19). 9. Categories, Ch. 8 (8b 28, 9a 14, 9a 29, 10a 11). 10. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (9a 10). [3.144.187.103] Project MUSE (2024-04-24 09:32 GMT) QUESTIONS 30–36 255 is unsuitably posited through “easily moveable” and “with difficulty moveable,” which Aristotle11 posits, since these, because they are opposites, do not inhere in the same . 6. Second, habit is one most general ; therefore, it is not a species of quality. 7. Third, those that are posited in this species, for example knowledge, virtue, and others of this kind,12 are relatives according to Aristotle above in the chapter “On Relation” and in Bk. IV of the Topics,13 in the many considerations of relative opposites . And if these are relatives (ad aliquid), then the genus of them, which is habit, is relative (ad aliquid). The implication is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Topics,14 in the first consideration of relative opposites. Therefore, it is not a species of quality. 8. Fourth, in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,15 Aristotle says that disposition (dispositio) is the disposition (ordinatio) of the parts into having parts; but the order (ordo) of parts is not a species of quality; therefore, neither is disposition of its species. 9. To the opposite is Aristotle. [Question Thirty...

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