Questions on Aristotle's Categories

Question Twenty-Nine

244 [QUESTION TWENTY-NINE Whether the Same Thing can be Essentially Referred to Diverse Things] t is asked whether the same can be essentially (per se) referred to diverse . 1. Proof that it cannot: Since in Bk. V of the Metaphysics in the chapter “On Relation ,”1 Aristotle holds it as ridiculous that the same thing is said twice, that is, that it is referred to two correlatives. 2. Second, if some relative, for example A, can be essentially (per se) referred to two things, as to B and to C, it follows that the same thing can simultaneously be and not be. The consequent is false; therefore, the antecedent . Proof of the implication: since its two correlatives, as B and C, do not refer to each other; therefore, one can exist without the other , as B can exist if C does not exist; but if B exists, A is; and if C does not exist, A is not; therefore, the same , that is A, will simultaneously be and not be. 3. Third, the being of a relative is to have itself to another;2 but a relationship (habitudo) to two is not the same ; therefore, the one being of one relative is not to have itself to two. Therefore, no relative, essentially (essentialiter ) one, is essentially (per se) referred to two things. 4. Fourth, if there could be two definitions of the same relative , and so the same relative could simultaneously be known 1. Metaphysics, Bk. V, Ch. 15 (1021b 2–3). 2. Categories, Ch. 7 (8a 32–33). QUESTION 29 245 and unknown. This seems untenable, since there is only one cognition of one non-complex . 5. To the opposite: All species of a relative are said to that to which its genus , according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Topics.3 And beyond this it can have another proper correlative other than the correlative of its genus. Therefore, it is essentially (per se) referred to two: for it is essentially (per se) referred to the correlative of its genus, since upon whatever genus it essentially depends , so also does the species. 6. Second, the species is referred to the genus and to the individual , therefore to two. Otherwise, Porphyry4 would not have assigned two or three of its definitions ; therefore, etc. 7. Third, the more similar is essentially (per se) referred to the less similar, and beyond this it is referred to that to which the absolutely similar is referred; therefore, to two . One can argue in this way about every relative , said according to more and less, that the more is referred to the less and vice versa, and also beyond this, that they are referred to that to which a simple relative also is referred. [I. To The Question] 8. One can reply to this that the same thing is not primarily referred to two, that is, according to its own proper account; since then it would not be essentially one, as the one reason to the contrary proves.5 Nevertheless, something can be essentially (per se) referred to two things that are not altogether diverse, but of which one includes the other in some way, as the reasons to the opposite prove.6 Since according to its proper form something can be said to one, and according to the form of its genus to another to which it is not primarily said (since it is not according to its proper 3. Topics, Bk. IV, Ch. 4 (124b 16). 4. Isagoge, Ch. “On Species” (AL I6 9; ed. Busse, 4.9–13). 5. Cf. supra, n. 3. 6. Cf. supra, nn. 5–7. 246 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS account according to which it is distinguished from the other species), although essentially (per se), since according to the genus which is essentially (per se) of its understanding. [II. To The Principal Arguments Of Each Part] [A. To the Principal Arguments] 9. To the arguments, is almost evident. 10. To the first :7 Aristotle holds it as ridiculous that something is primarily referred to two as to its understanding and to its intelligible,8 according to what is said there; or perhaps to two altogether diverse things, of which kind there are two others. 11. To the ,9 I say that––when B and C are two existing to which A is essentially (per se) referred— either it is not possible for one of them...