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Question Twenty-Eight
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237 [QUESTION TWENTY-EIGHT Whether it is Necessary in the Definition of One Relative to Posit Its Correlative] t is asked whether it is necessary in the definition of one relative to posit its correlative. 1. It seems that it is not: Since everything that ought to be posited in the definition is prior and better known, as a genus or differentia with respect to defined; but with respect to being defined, it is related to its correlative in none of these ways; therefore, etc. The minor is evident with respect to its two primary members through the argument to the opposite in the preceding question.1 2. Second, every definition indicates the essence of the defined ; but one relative is not of the essence of the other, since the being of a relative is “to have itself to another”; “another,” however, expresses a diversity in the essence; therefore, etc. 3. Third, in the definition of one opposite, the other ought not be posited; relatives are opposites; therefore , etc. Proof of the major: first, since contradictories follow all opposites, and in the definition of one contradictory the other ought not be posited; therefore, neither in other opposites.2 The implication is evident, since the consequent does not pertain to the definition of any , nor does the antecedent.—Second, since any 1. Cf. supra, q. 27, n. 1. 2. Cf. infra, n. 15, where Scotus claims that the form of this argument is not valid. 238 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS part of a definition can be predicated of that about which the defined is also predicated, according to Aristotle in the third consideration of Bk. II of the Topics.3 Therefore, if in the definition of one opposite the other is posited, two opposites would be predicated of the same , which is untenable . The minor is evident in that chapter “as often, however, as it is accustomed to be opposed,”4 where Aristotle enumerates “relative opposition”5 as one species of opposition , and exemplifies , as “double,” “half,” giving us to understand that this follows in all relatives. 4. If it is said that the major is true only in opposites other than relatives, against this: Contraries and contradictories are opposed relatively, since a contrary is said contrary to a contrary; therefore, if one contrary is not defined through the other, not every relative will be defined through its correlative. 5. Likewise, “every differentia according to its species is a contrariety,” according to Aristotle in Bk. X of the Metaphysics;6 but relative opposites differ in species; therefore, they are contraries . Therefore, if the major is true about contraries, it will also be true about relative opposites. 6. Fourth, a name and its definition signify the same , according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Metaphysics;7 but the name of a relative does not signify its correlative, since then by expressing the one with the other there would be a vain repetition ; therefore, neither ought the other be posited in the definition . 7. Fifth, any definition of a relative is good when its correlative is not posited, as this : “species is that which is predicated of many differing in number, etc.,”8 where 3. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 2 (110a 5–9). 4. Categories, Ch. 10 (11b 16 [in the apparatus]). 5. Categories, Ch. 10 (11b 25–26). 6. Metaphysics, Bk. X, Ch. 8 (1058a 15–17). 7. Metaphysics, Bk. IV, Ch. 7 (1012a 23–25). 8. Isagoge, Ch. “On Species” (AL I6 9; ed. Busse, 4.11–12). [44.211.58.249] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 10:29 GMT) QUESTION 28 239 genus is not posited to that with respect to which the species is relatively said; therefore, it is not always necessary for a relative to be defined through its correlative. 8. Sixth, all the reasons that are applied to the preceding question,9 which prove that one relative can exist without the other, prove that one must not be defined through the other; for nothing is defined through that without which it can exist. 9. To the opposite is Porphyry in the chapter “On Species,” who says that a genus is said to its species and conversely:10 “Therefore, it is necessary in the accounts of each to use each of the two.” 10. Likewise, Aristotle11 says here that it is impossible for one relative to be known definitely unless the other is known; but every non-complex is known definitely when it is known through its own...