Questions on Aristotle's Categories

Question Fifteen

171 [QUESTION FIFTEEN Whether the Parts of Substance are Substances] You should not be disturbed the parts of substance.1 t is asked concerning this whether the parts of substance are substances. 1. It seems that they are not. Since substance as it is the most general is essentially (per se) a being; no part of substance is essentially (per se) a being while it is a part of substance, since then it would be “this something,”2 and one substance would be from many “this something,” which does not seem true. 2. Second, let any part of a substance be A. If A is a substance, by descending divisively from the most general , it would be necessary to concede that it would be either that substance of which it is a part, or a distinct species in opposition to it, or what is contained in some species distinct from that . Since, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the Topics3 “every that is in genus, is in some of its species.” It is not that of which it is a part, since that is not predicated of it. It is not another species. Nor is it in another species, since then it would differ from its whole self specifically, and so through an essential differentia , and also from every other part. But this is not possible: both because every part would have a specific 1. Categories, Ch. 5 (3a 29–33). 2. On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (412a 6–9). 3. Topics, Bk. II, Ch. 4 (111a 33–34). 172 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS form, since every differentia is taken from such a form, and so no part would be a part of the whole, nor would it constitute its essence, nor one essentially with another part; and because then every part through a proper form would be a being in act, and “from two in act it would not constitute one truly,” according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,4 and so no whole would be truly one. 3. Third, if any part of a substance is a substance, and no part of a man is a man, it follows that “therefore no man is a substance .” The conclusion is false, and not the minor, therefore the major. The form of arguing is evident according to Aristotle in Bk. IV of the Physics,5 since such a form of arguing is used against those who posit that time is a circulation, in this way: “any part of time is time; not any part of circulation is circulation ; therefore, time is not a circulation.” Therefore, if the form of arguing is valid there, it is also here. 4. Fourth, in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,6 it is said about matter that “it is not what something is (quid), nor how it is (quale),” etc.; therefore, it is not a substance. 5. Fifth, form is not substance, since it is in a subject.7 —Also, since it is “present and absent beyond the corruption of the subject ,”8 as is evident in a substantial transformation. 6. To the opposite, one can argue through the three reasons made to the opposite of the preceding question.9 7. Second, the divided is predicated of divide it; Bk. II of On the Soul:10 “substance is divided into matter and form and the composite”; therefore, any of these is a substance. 8. Third, in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics,11 Aristotle says that 4. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 13 (1039a 4–5). 5. Physics, Bk. IV, Ch. 10 (218b 2–4). 6. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 3 (1029a 20–21). 7. Categories, Ch. 5 (3a 21–22). 8. Porphyry, Isagoge, Ch. “On Accident” (AL I6 20; ed. Busse, 12.24–25). 9. Cf. supra, q. 14, nn. 6–8. 10. On the Soul, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (412a 7–9). 11. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 3 (1029a 2–8). QUESTION 15 173 form is a greater being than matter, and therefore it is a greater being than the composite. In this implication it is implied that matter is a greater being than the composite. Then I argue in this way: substance is the greatest being;12 therefore, if that which is the least being, for example the composite, is a substance (as is evident), by much more will matter and form, which are greater beings than the...