Questions on Aristotle's Categories

Question Nine

116 [QUESTION NINE Whether this Rule, “When One Thing is Predicated of Another,” Etc., is True] t is asked whether the first rule of Aristotle1 is true, namely, “when one thing is predicated of another, whatever is predicated of the predicate, is predicated of the subject.”2 1. It seems that it is false: Since “animal” is predicated of man, and “white” of animal, therefore “white” of man; therefore, according to this rule this implication would hold, “an animal is white; therefore, a man is white,” where it seems to be a fallacy of the consequent. Similarly, the antecedent can be true without the consequent .3 2. Second, according to this rule, it would follow that “sub1 . Categories, Ch. 3 (1b 10–15). 2. In order to understand the significance of this question, it should be noted that the phrase “when one thing is predicated of another” implies that what is predicated has a necessary, essential relation to the subject that is not captured by the simple categorical structure “s is p.” 3. This initial argument is a classic example of the syllogism known as Barbara , i.e., a universal affirmative syllogism in the first figure. In its strongest form, the argument would look like this: “All animals are white; all men are animals; therefore, all men are white.” The dubious implication that Scotus refers to here, however, is a conditional argument in this form: “If a man is white, then an animal is white; but an animal is white; therefore, a man is white,” which is an example of affirming the consequent, for it is possible that there are white animals without there being any white men. QUESTION 9 117 stance is the highest genus; therefore, an animal is the highest genus.”4 3. Third, if something is predicated of a predicate, it is predicated of the subject; but “predicate” is predicated of a predicate , since a predicate is a predicate; therefore, “predicate” is predicated of a subject; therefore, a subject is a predicate. 4. To the opposite is Aristotle. [I. The Status Of The Question:] [A. The Opinion of Others] 5. It is said5 that the rule is true: (A) when three essentially ordered are taken in the same genus: whatever is predicated essentially (as “to be predicated” is taken here) of the predicate, is predicated essentially of the subject.—With this (B) the rule must also be understood when an intermediate predicate is not changed in comparison to its predicate and to the subject of which it is predicated. 6. According to the first condition, the first two arguments6 are solved: since “white” and “highest genus” are not predicated of animal and of substance essentially.—Similarly, the second 7 is solved according to the variation of the intermediate predicate, since by arguing in this way, as there,8 there is a fallacy of accident. 7. To the third ,9 it is said10 that (C) the rule ought to be understood of “to be predicated” signified in 4. The missing premise in this enthymeme is as follows: substance is predicated of animal, or an animal is a substance. 5. Cf. Albertus Magnus, Praedic., Tr. 1 c. 6 (ed. Borgnet, I 161b). 6. Cf. supra, nn. 1–2. 7. Cf. supra, n. 2. 8. Namely, “substance is the most general [genus]; animal is a substance; therefore, animal is the most general [genus].” 9. Cf. supra, n. 3. 10. The identity of those who held this position is uncertain. 118 JOHN DUNS SCOTUS the intentions; in the bases of “to be predicated” as it is exercised.11 It is argued, however, in the intentions with “is,” through which the predication is effected; therefore, it does not hold.12 11. According to Nuchelmans, “the application of the distinction exercitus/ significatus to the act of predication” was more widely diffused by Scotus. “In that use it seems to have been made especially popular by John Duns Scotus, who connected the distinction between a praedicatio exercita—for instance Homo est animal—and a praedicatio significata—for example Genus praedicatur de specie— with the distinction between two levels of conceiving of which first-order and second-order concepts (intentiones primae and intentiones secundae) are characteristic ”; Gabriel Nuchelmans, “The Distinction Actus Exercitus/Actus Significatus,” 74. See also I. Rosier, “La Distinction Entre Actus Exercitus et Actus Significatus Dans Les Sophismes Grammaticaux du MS BN Lat. 16618 et Autres Textes Apparentes ,” in Sophisms in...