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104 [QUESTION EIGHT Whether a Denominative Signifies the Same as an Abstract] oncerning the definition of denominatives, it is asked whether they differ by ending alone,1 that is, in regard to the subject by only declining from the principal from which they have denomination, or whether they also differ in their significates.2 And this is to investigate whether a denominative signifies the same as an ab1 . Although literal, “ending alone” is perhaps misleading. A denominative term is one that is derived from another term, as “grammarian” is derived from “grammar.” In Greek and Latin, a denominative term, such as “good person,” is often formed from the abstract term “good” simply by changing the gender from neuter to masculine. To capture the meaning in English, the question might better be paraphrased as “it is asked whether the two terms differ by spelling alone, that is, by changing the spelling from the abstract noun in regard to the subject from which a denominative term is formed, or whether the two terms differ in their significates.” 2. Sten Ebbesen provides the following two columns and an explanation of the controversy regarding denominatives: a b GOOD (to agathon) good person (ho agathos) JUSTICE (dikaiosyne) just person (ho dikaios) Column a contains names of absolute entities. The higher entity is the genus of the lower. Column b contains the names of entities which participate in the absolute entities of Column a. If, as in the case of the just person, they have a name that is cognate with that of the absolute entity in which they participate, they are said to be paronyma (Latin: denominativa) from it. No Column b entity is a genus, nor is it in a genus. “Good” is a genus, and justice is in that genus, being precisely (or essentially: hoper) good. “Good person” is not a genus, and “just person” is in no genus –– the just person is not “precisely good.” Similarly, whiteness is in the genus “color,” but the white man is not. In the Latin tradition entities of type a came to be called abstracta; those of type b, concreta, i.e., “combined ” or “mixed”; Ebbesen, “Concrete Accidental Terms,” 109. QUESTION 8 105 stract , namely, only the form, or something else as the subject.3 1. And it seems that it signifies the subject:4 For, according to Aristotle in Bk. I of On Interpretation in the chapter “On the Verb,” to signify is to establish an understanding ;5 but a spoken, concrete noun establishes an understanding of the subject; therefore, it signifies that . Proof of the minor: it establishes an understanding of an accident, and it is impossible for an to be understood without its subject: first, since it is impossible to exist without a subject, and “as each thing is with respect to being, so is it with respect to truth,” that is, to a true cognition, according to Aristotle in Bk. II of the Metaphysics.6 Second, since, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics ,7 “substance is the first of all in the cognition.” Therefore, nothing is signified without that . Through this , it is also proved that the subject is signified primarily, since the is primarily understood by a spoken utterance, since an accident cannot be understood without a , and the is prior in cognition to the accident, according to Aristotle in Bk. VII of the Metaphysics.8 2. Second, a term signifies the same that it supposits ;9 but a concrete accidental term supposits a subject; therefore, etc. The major is evident: since a suppositing term, by the fact that it supposits, does not have a new significate. The 3. The question is whether denominatives differ by case alone, and hence signify only the form, or whether they also differ in their significates and hence signify the subject as well as the form. 4. That is, it seems that it does not signify the form alone. 5. The Latin is as follows: ... et significant aliquid—constituit enim qua dicit intellectum , et qua audit quiesci; see On Interpretation, Ch. 3 (16b 20–21). 6. Metaphysics, Bk. II, Ch. 1 (993b 28–31). 7. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 31–33). 8. Metaphysics, Bk. VII, Ch. 1 (1028a 37–b 3). 9. An alternate translation would be: “a term signifies the same thing that it stands for.” For example, in the statement “Socrates is a man,” the subject term both signifies an individual and stands for him in the statement...

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