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Questions on Aristotle's Categories

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Publication Year: 2014

Published by: The Catholic University of America Press

Title Page, About the Series, Copyright, Dedication

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Contents

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pp. vii-viii

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Acknowledgments

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pp. ix-x

I would like to thank Drs. William Frank, Philipp Rosemann, and Jorge J. E. Gracia for their support, guidance, and encouragement as I worked my way through this difficult text. I would also like to thank Dr. Carole Burnett for her editorial work and for correcting my Latin on...

Abbreviations and Sigla

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pp. xi-xii

Select Bibliography

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pp. xiii-xxiv

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Introduction

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pp. 1-40

Aristotle’s Categories1 is the subject of an extensive number of commentaries and of an unusual amount of debate, and for good reasons. To begin with, in spite of its relatively short length, it is a rather difficult text to understand, especially for those who are just beginning their study of philosophy. Yet, because it lays...

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Question One: Whether the Book of the Categories is About Ten Utterances Signifying the Ten Genera of Things

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pp. 41-49

Equivocals are said, etc.1

It is asked whether the book of The Categories is about ten utterances signifying the ten genera of things.2

1. It seems that [the subject is the ten utterances signifying the ten genera of things]:
Since Boethius says so.3
2. Second, this work is concerned with [what is] univocal...

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Question Two: Whether this Book is About the Ten Categories as about a Subject

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pp. 50-57

It is asked whether this book is about the ten categories as its subject.

1. It seems that it is not:
Since “to know is to understand (cognoscere) the thing through its cause” according to Aristotle in Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics,1 therefore everything knowable has a cause; these ten...

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Question Three: Whether Some Intentional Predicate is Univocal to the Most General Genera

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pp. 58-62

It is asked about something posited in the previous solution,1 namely, whether there is something univocal to the most general [genera], and primarily whether some intentional predicate is univocal to them.

1. It seems that there is...

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Question Four: Whether Being is Univocal to the Ten Categories

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pp. 63-82

It is asked whether being is univocal to the ten categories.

1. It seems that it is, according to the middle [terms] studied in logic.1
There is no contradiction in equivocals, according to Aristotle in the Sophistical Refutations;2 but this is a contradiction: “Socrates is a being, and Socrates is not a...

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Question Five: Whether the Definition of Equivocals is Suitably Given

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pp. 83-91

It is asked whether the definition of equivocals is suitably given, namely, that “equivocals are said [to be things] of which only the name is common; however, [according to the name]1 the account2 of the substance is diverse.”3

1. It seems that it is not...

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Question Six: Whether the Definition of Univocals is Good

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pp. 92-97

It is asked whether the definition of univocals is suitable, namely, this [definition]: “Univocals are [those things] the name of which is common and the account of the substance is the same.”1

1. One can argue that it is not [suitable] according to the first three arguments in the preceding...

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Question Seven: Whether a Genus is Univocal with Regard to Its Species

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pp. 98-103

It is asked about the example that Aristotle1 gives to illustrate the account of univocals (“for example, man is an animal, and cow [is an animal]”), whether the genus is univocal with regard to its species.

1. It seems that it is not:
Since, according to Aristotle in Book VII of the...

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Question Eight: Whether a Denominative Signifies the Same as an Abstract

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pp. 104-115

Concerning the definition of denominatives, it is asked whether they differ by ending alone,1 that is, in regard to the subject by only declining [away] from the principal [cases] from which they have denomination, or whether they also differ in their significates.2 And this is to investigate...

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Question Nine: Whether this Rule, “When One Thing is Predicated of Another,” Etc., is True

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pp. 116-123

It is asked whether the first rule of Aristotle1 is true, namely, “when one thing is predicated of another, whatever is predicated of the predicate, is predicated of the subject.”2

1. It seems that it is false:
Since “animal” is predicated of man, and “white” [is predicated] of...

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Question Ten: It is to be Asked About the Second Rule: Whether the Same Can Be in Diverse Genera

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pp. 124-132

It is asked about the truth of this rule:1 “of diverse genera [that are] not posited in subalternation [to each other], the species and differentiae are diverse,” whether something that is the same can be in diverse genera.

1. It seems that it can:
Body is in the genus of...

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Question Eleven: Whether there are Only Ten Most General Genera

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pp. 133-144

Of non-complex [terms] a single [term] either signifies substance, etc.1

Concerning this it is asked whether there are only ten most general [genera].

1. It seems that there are not [only ten most general genera].
Being is divided into substance and accident, into absolute and non-absolute...

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Question Twelve: Whether “Some Man” is a Primary Substance

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pp. 145-153

Concerning the chapter on substance, it is asked whether “some man” is a primary substance.

1. It seems that it is:
According to the authority of Aristotle, who exemplifies a primary substance in this way: as “some man,” [or] “some horse.”1 And later on, when he maintains that everything else is said...

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Question Thirteen: Whether Certain Implications of Aristotle Hold Formally

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pp. 154-166

Therefore, all others either are said of primary substances or are in them.1

It is asked about the implications which Aristotle2 gives for proving this conclusion, namely, “animal is predicated of man; therefore, [it is predicated] of some man” and “color is in a body; therefore, [it is] in some...

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Question Fourteen: Is the Differentia of the Genus of Substance a Substance?

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pp. 167-170

It is common to every substance not to be in a subject. This, however, is not proper to a substance, but is also [proper] to a differentia.1

In speaking about that which is under an intention, it is asked concerning this whether a differentia in the genus of substance is a substance.

1. According to the text here, it...

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Question Fifteen: Whether the Parts of Substance are Substances

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pp. 171-177

You should not be disturbed [if] the parts of substance.1

It is asked concerning this [statement] whether the parts of substance are substances.

1. It seems that they are not.
Since substance as it is the most general [genus] is essentially (per se) a being; no part of substance is essentially...

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Questions Sixteen and Seventeen: Whether Quantity is a Genus / Whether Quantity is One Genus

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pp. 178-188

Of quantity, one[type] is continuous, the other is discrete.1

It is asked first whether quantity is a genus.

1. It seems that it is not [a genus]:
Since “no genus is predicated denominatively of a species.”2 But this is true: “a line is of a certain quantity (quanta),” and thus [it is predicated] of others which are...

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Questions Eighteen and Nineteen: Whether Speech is a Quantity / Whether Speech is a Discrete Quantity

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pp. 189-192

It is asked whether speech is a quantity.

1. It seems that it is not:
Since speech is not in writing, for that is a substance. It is not in the mind, since that is in [something that is] not quantified. And neither [writing nor the mind] essentially (per se) measures [something], and Aristotle explains that he understands...

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Questions Twenty through Twenty-Three: Whether Aristotle Sufficiently Enumerates the Species of Quantity / Whether Place is a Quantity / Whether Place is a Continuous Quantity / Whether the Particles of a Body and of a Place are Joined Together at the...

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pp. 193-200

It is asked whether Aristotle sufficiently enumerates the species of quantity.

1. It seems that he does not:
According to Aristotle in Bk. V of the Metaphysics:2 time is a quantum through an accident; but genus is predicated accidentally of no species; therefore, time is not a...

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Question Twenty-Four: Whether there is Something Contrary to Quantity

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pp. 201-207

It is asked whether anything is contrary to quantity.

1. It seems that there is:
Primarily, through general arguments (rationes). Some quantity is more distant from another [quantity]; another quantity is less [distant from another quantity]. Therefore, some [quantity] is extremely distant from another...

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Question Twenty-Five: Whether the Genus of Relation is One Genus

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pp. 208-223

Indeed, such things are said to another.1

First, it is asked whether the genus of relation is one genus.

1. It seems that it is not:
One univocal genus is not common to being and non-being; but some relations are beings, and some [relations] are non-beings; therefore, etc. Proof of the second part of the...

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Question Twenty-Six: Whether the Second Description of Relatives is Suitably Given

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pp. 224-229

It is asked whether the second description of relatives that Aristotle posits1 is suitably given.

1. It seems that it is not:
Since that [description] pertains to nothing in the genus of relation; therefore, it does not pertain to the most general [genus] of relation. Proof of the antecedent: since if the being of a...

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Question Twenty-Seven: Whether Relatives are Simultaneous by Nature

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pp. 230-236

Concerning the fourth property, it is asked whether relatives are simultaneous by nature.

1. It seems that they are not.
Since, according to Porphyry,1 a genus is referred its species and vice versa; but these are not simultaneous by nature, since that is naturally prior “from which the implication of subsisting...

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Question Twenty-Eight: Whether it is Necessary in the Definition of One Relative to Posit Its Correlative

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pp. 237-243

It is asked whether it is necessary in the definition of one relative to posit its correlative.

1. It seems that it is not:
Since everything that ought to be posited in the definition is prior and better known, as a genus or differentia with respect to [what is being] defined; but with respect to...

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Question Twenty-Nine: Whether the Same Thing can be Essentially Referred to Diverse Things

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pp. 244-252

It is asked whether the same [thing] can be essentially (per se) referred to diverse [things].

1. Proof that it cannot:
Since in Bk. V of the Metaphysics in the chapter “On Relation,”1 Aristotle holds it as ridiculous that the same thing is said twice, that is, that it is referred to two...

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Questions Thirty through Thirty-Six: Whether the Species of Quality are Suitably Assigned / Whether the First Species of Quality is Habit and Disposition / Whether the Second Species of Quality is Natural Ability or Inability / Whether the Third...

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pp. 253-286

I say, however, that quality is that according to which something is qualified,1 etc.

First, it is asked whether the species of quality are suitably assigned.

1. It seems that they are not:
No multiple has species; but quality is multiple, according to Aristotle in this text:2 “quality is of those things which are said...

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Questions Thirty-Seven and Thirty-Eight: Whether Opposition is a Real or an Intentional Accident / Whether the Division of Opposition into These Four, Namely, Relative Opposition, Contrary Opposition, Contradictory Opposition, and Privative Opposition...

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pp. 287-303

As often, however, as things are accustomed to be opposed,1 etc.

Concerning this it is asked first whether opposition is a real or an intentional accident.

1. It seems that it is real:
Since it is only for the metaphysician to consider being and real accidents of being; for accidents of being, as they are considered...

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Question Thirty-Nine: Whether Some Contraries Lack an Intermediate

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pp. 304-310

It is asked whether some contraries lack an intermediate.

1. It seems that [some contraries] do not [lack an intermediate]:
Since if some were such [as to lack an intermediate], then of them there would not be any intermediate in itself; therefore, they would be contradictories. Proof of the first...

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Question Forty: Whether it is Possible of Some Contraries that One Determinate [Thing] be in Some Subject By Nature

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pp. 311-313

In addition, one member1 is connected to this: that in both contrary [things] it sometimes happens that one extreme inheres [in a subject] by nature; which does not happen in privative [opposites].
From this, therefore, one can ask of some contraries whether it is possible for one determinate...

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Question Forty-One: Whether From a Privation a Regression to a Habit Can Happen

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pp. 314-318

Further, in contraries it is also [possible for a change to happen into the other].1

Aristotle posits the following difference between contraries and privative opposites. There is a mutual change between contraries, [there is] not [a mutual change] between privative opposites. Since “a change can...

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Question Forty-Two: Whether in a Negative [Opposition] the Subject Stands for Being and for Non-Being Indifferently

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pp. 319-323

Indeed, whatever [things are opposed] as an affirmation and negation, etc.1

Here, Aristotle assigns the differentia between contradictory opposites and all other [opposites], since in all other [opposites] it is not necessary for one extreme to be true and the other one to be false. In...

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Question Forty-Three: Whether Aristotle Suitably Assigns the Modes of Prior

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pp. 324-331

One [thing] is prior to another, etc.1

Concerning this, it is asked whether Aristotle suitably assigns the modes of prior.

1. It seems that he does not:
Since, in Bk. V of the Metaphysics,2 he assigns many more, for example, prior in place, prior according to cognition, prior according to motion and many...

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Question Forty-Four: Whether Aristotle Suitably Distinguishes the Species of Motion

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pp. 332-338

There are six species of motion, etc.1

It is asked whether Aristotle suitably distinguishes the species of motion.

1. It seems that he does not.
Since those into which it is distinguished are in diverse genera, for example “alteration is in quality and augmentation is in quantity”;2 therefore, nothing is univocal to...

Index

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pp. 339-343


E-ISBN-13: 9780813226156
Print-ISBN-13: 9780813226149

Page Count: 352
Publication Year: 2014

Series Title: Medieval Continuation Series

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Subject Headings

  • Aristotle. Categoriae.
  • Categories (Philosophy).
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