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Appendix 2 Eudemian Ethics ii,6–9 I. Setting the Agenda [EE ii,6, 1222b15] Let us take up, then, another starting point for the subsequent investigation. So, all substances are by nature principles of sorts, and so each is also capable of generating many more such as itself: a man men, or, generally , an animal animals, and a plant plants. But in addition to these things, man, alone [20] among animals, is the principle of certain actions, for we would not say that any of the others act. Of these principles, such as are the first sources of movements are called sovereign principles, and most properly so called are the sources of necessity—over which perhaps God rules. Among immobile things, among mathematical entities, for example, there is no sovereign principle. In any case, however, this is meant [25] as an analogy, for also here, if the principle is altered, all the things demonstrated from it would certainly change but the things demonstrated do not change one another, one destroyed by the other —except in the case of the destruction of an assumption, by means of which something is demonstrated.1 Man, however, is the principle of a certain move280 1 J. Solomon explains this latter remark (“except in the case of the destruction of an assumption , by means of which something is demonstrated” [1222b27–28]) in the following manner: “e.g. if ἀρχή A led to B and C, of which C was absurd, then C by refuting A would refute the other consequence B” [J. Solomon, Ethica Eudemia, vol. 9.2 of The Works of Aristotle, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon, 1915), ad loc]. Not incompatibly, I understand the larger passage (1225b25–28) as Aristotle ’s acknowledging that the analogy with mathematical principles limps somewhat. It is true that mathematical principles have a direct bearing upon the propositions that are derived from them and so (in a sense) they are ἀρχαί κύρια, but, as Solomon explains, a denied derived proposition can also influence another derived proposition, as in a reductio ad impossibile (“the destruction of an assumption , by means of which something is demonstrated”). Such a thing does not happen with human actions: their voluntary character depends just upon the will (and intellect) of the agent and not on Appendix 2 281 ment, for action is movement. Since [30] as in other things the principle is the cause of the things that are or come about because of it, it is necessary to understand it as in the case of demonstrations. For if, a triangle having angles equal to two right angles, a quadrilateral figure must have angles equal to four right angles, it is clear that the cause of this is the triangle’s having angles equal to two right angles. But if the triangle should change, [35] the quadrilateral must change, for instance, if the one has angles equal to three, the other must have angles equal to six, if four, eight. But if the one should not change, as the one is, so must the other be. That what we are attempting to show here is necessary is apparent from the Analytics, although at the moment it is not possible to deny or to affirm precisely more than this; for, if there is no other reason [40] for the triangle’s being the way it is, it would be a principle of sorts and the cause of the things that come later. Just so, if it is possible for some entities to be in contrary states, it is necessary that their principles be also such. [1223a1] For, from things that hold of necessity, a necessary conclusion follows, but from these might come about opposites —and many such things are up to men themselves and they are also the principles of such things. So it is clear that, of the acts of which man is [5] the principle and sovereign, these might both come about and not and it is up to him whether they come about or not—in any case those of which he is master of their being or not being. As many, however, as it is up to him to or not to do, he is the cause of these; and, of as many as he is the cause, they are up to him. Since virtue and vice and [10] their works are some praisable, some blamable (for blamed and praised are not those things that come about due to necessity or chance...

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