Action and Character According to Aristotle

8. Some Other Character Types

Eight Some Other Character Types o Aristotle employs in his ethical writings a veritable menagerie of character types, most of whom we have already met. They include the φρόνιμος (the practically wise man), the σπουδαῖος (the good man), the ἀκρατής (the incontinent man), the ἀκόλαστος (the depraved man), and the ἐγκρατής (the self-constrained man). Aristotle’s analysis of these character types exploits many of the ideas we have seen in previous chapters of this book, especially the principle of non-contradiction and the distinction between the per se and the per accidens, although he brings in also other logical principles we have not yet seen. The present chapter begins (in section I) with some brief descriptions , employing concepts set out in earlier chapters, of the major character types discussed by Aristotle. These are preliminary sketches, to be filled out later in the chapter. Section II is about the role of the principle of non-contradiction in the practical realm. Again, this section employs ideas we have already seen, although here special attention is drawn to Plato’s analysis of the soul in Republic [R.] iv, where he maintains that, even in the soul divided by conflicting inclinations, there is a core unit that goes forward toward just one of a number of incompatible alternatives . This idea is important for understanding the psychological structure of the ἀκρατής. 240 This is followed (in sections III to VII) by a detailed examination of a passage in EE vii,6 where Aristotle sets out a logical analysis of the ἀκρατής and other related character types. Section III looks at the first three sentences of the passage, which are considerably less difficult than what follows. The idea in these sentences is that (as Plato suggests in R. iv) even the divided soul has a core unit that remains indivisible. This means that even the man with a divided soul can (given the satisfaction of other conditions) be held responsible for his actions: his core unity can be reduced to the more pervasive unity of the good man (who is the knowing agent par excellence). In the next three sentences of the EE vii,6, passage Aristotle says some—at first glance—strange things about a certain “Coriscus.” His remarks appear less strange once one understands that Aristotle is employing the sophistic method of hypostatizing ideas one might have about an individual as if the ideas too were individuals. As explained in section IV, employing this method (while rejecting the sophists’ ontological claims), Aristotle is able to analyze in terms of temporal units, besides the ἀκρατής, the character type called “the repenter” and the one called “the liar.” In section V, we offer an explanation of why in the fifth sentence of the EE vii,6 passage Aristotle speaks of Coriscus and of aspects (or parts) of his soul as quantities. We derive this explanation from Aristotle’s very elastic concept of ‘quantity,’ which includes not only numbers and distances but also (as he says in Metaph. v,13) qualities such as being musical. Aristotle says that such qualities are called quantities not because of what they are in themselves but because of what they apply to; they apply, that is, to extended things, such as admit of quantity. He also says that, when the things to which these qualities apply are substances—such as are indivisible —the quantitative analysis applies to them not as indivisible but as moving through space and time. The final sentence in the EE vii,6 passage reads: “For when they accuse themselves, they kill themselves; but each seems to himself good.” In section VI, we argue that the “they” who accuse and kill themselves are internally conflicted character types such as the ἀκρατής. Aristotle appears to be worried that his audience, having heard him say that within all these types there is a central part that considers itself good and therefore wants Some Other Character Types 241 242 Some Other Character Types to do good for itself, will wonder how it is that such types occasionally kill themselves. This is not the only possible reading of the sentence, but it does correspond to a remark in a parallel passage in EN ix,4. Showing that the two passages are parallel is not difficult to do, although there does appear to be a discrepancy between the two having to do, in fact, with the love that conflicted character types feel toward themselves. We offer a solution to...