Living the Good Life

12. Practical Wisdom

150 12 Practical Wisdom Knowledge without justice ought to be called cunning rather than wisdom. Plato Making Practical Judgments We have already suggested that ethics is more than resolving complicated moral questions, for even after the questions are answered, the choices must be made. Those choices, we have seen, will be heavily influenced by our habits of desiring. As I stand in the bank holding the teller’s extra twenty dollars, I may judge that I should return the extra money, but if I am greedy, then I am likely to take it anyway. Still, you might insist, part of ethics is figuring out what is to be done. And so it is. A class discussing a thorny moral issue, then, is not wasted. It might help develop those mental skills necessary to make good moral judgments. But we must avoid a simplistic division between judging what is to be done and doing it, as if the first were wholly a men- 151 PraCTiCal wisDom tal activity and the second were wholly a volitional or affective activity. The two are in fact intertwined, so that one cannot be wholly disentangled from the other. Judgment is not entirely mental but involves an affective element, and choice is ineffectual without the guidance of reason. The virtue of practical wisdom, sometimes called prudence, bridges the boundary between mental judgment and affective desire. Moderation and courage are in the emotions; justice is in the will; practical wisdom, on the other hand, is a virtue of reason (II-II, 47, 1). It is right reason about things to be done. But while it resides most properly in reason, which judges what is to be done and commands its execution, practical wisdom rests upon the affective virtues, for clear-sighted judgment can be made only with right desire, and the execution of the deed can be carried out only with a firm will. Discussing moral issues and particular cases, then, will not necessarily develop good judgment. No doubt such discussions provide assistance, chiefly in considering the many circumstances and ramifications of our actions. But ultimately they cannot provide good reasoning, which presupposes right desire or appetite . Indeed, their abstraction from sound principles and right desire may engender a disregard for the true goods that are found in reality, substituting a kind of relativism of judgment that we have already examined. We will see that truly good judgment, realized in the virtue of practical wisdom, is rooted in principle and applied through experience, with a love of the true good. Three Acts of Prudence According to Thomas the virtue of prudence has three primary acts: counsel, judgment, and command (II-II, 47, 8). In the act of counsel we consider our current situation and assess the op- 152 PraCTiCal wisDom tions before us. In the act of judgment we determine which of the options is best. Finally, we must command ourselves to do it. Many have successfully completed the first two tasks, ably considering the merit of each of their options and then judging which is to be done, but have lingered, unable to bring themselves fully to do it. They judge what is to be done, almost in an abstract way, but do not direct themselves to it. They have failed in the consummation of practical wisdom, so that however well they take counsel and judge, they will be far from wise. The first two actions are what Thomas calls speculative, for their primary concern is to judge the truth of the matter, but the third action is properly practical, for it applies reason to the action itself. The first two, therefore, are wholly acts of reason, although they enlist the aid of desire, while command is an act of reason mixed with will; it is the direction of reason together with the impetus of will (II-II, 47, 8). We should note that the word “speculative” is used in a slightly different manner than it was in the last chapter, in which it concerned knowing the truth just for the sake of understanding. Both counsel and judgments are not speculative in this sense. They are ultimately concerned with knowing how to act. Nevertheless, they lack the most complete sense of practical knowledge, because they are not bound up with the will to act, as is command. We can judge the truth of how to act without having the desire that moves us to...