Living the Good Life

10. Intrinsically Evil Actions

123 10 I ntrinsically evilActions Some actions and emotions ... imply by their very names that they are bad.... It is, therefore, impossible ever to do right in performing them: to perform them is always to do wrong. In cases of this sort, let us say adultery, rightness and wrongness do not depend on committing it with the right woman at the right time and in the right manner, but simply committing such actions at all is to do wrong. Aristotle Actions Wrong in Themselves Utilitarianism denies that any actions are universally wrong, no matter the circumstances. Take killing the innocent, for instance . Many people, Thomas included, would say we must never kill an innocent human being. No matter the circumstances, no matter the dire consequences that might follow from not killing, and no matter the noble motives of the killer, murder is always wrong everywhere and at all times. Utilitarianism, how- 124 inTrinsiCally evil aCTions ever, would disagree. After all, sometimes killing an innocent person might bring about more good for others. A classic example involves a man, let us call him Bernard, who happens upon a dictator ready to have twenty innocent people killed. Bernard protests the action, but the dictator does not listen. Finally, he relents, saying that he will not kill the twenty, just so long as Bernard kills one of them. Now Aquinas would insist that we should never kill an innocent person. On the other hand, a utilitarian would point out that by killing one person Bernard is bringing about a much greater good, for he is saving nineteen. We have already seen, as well, the example of framing an innocent person—which Aquinas would consider wrong in all situations at all times—in order to save many others. Utilitarianism justifies these sorts of actions, but Aquinas does not. While Aquinas did not actually confront utilitarianism in his lifetime, he did encounter similar sorts of situational ethics. In the century before Aquinas, for instance, Peter Abelard had defended an ethics of good intentions. An action is good or evil, he insisted, depending upon a person’s intention. His view was not so simplistic as to justify any action just so long as it arose from a good intention, but he did say that the act itself did not have moral worth apart from the person’s intention. Similar views retain their appeal today. All that matters, we are told, is that we act lovingly; our individual actions are not so crucial as is our fundamental disposition. These views are appealing because they allow us to justify almost anything we want badly enough. We can usually fabricate good intentions for our selfish actions. Abelard was particularly adept at coming up with interesting examples. Suppose a man sleeps with a woman who is not his wife—an act of adultery—but he mistakenly thinks that she is his wife. Then we surely would not blame him—he would not 125 inTrinsiCally evil aCTions have sinned—so the act of sleeping with another woman cannot itself be wrong, apart from intention. As unlikely and humorous as this example is, it seems to be taken from the scriptural account of Jacob and Leah, who was not the woman Jacob supposed he was marrying (Rachel). Similarly, rape is not sinful for the woman raped, for she does not consent to the act. Once again, it seems that the act itself is not evil. Or, suggests Abelard in a twist upon Oedipus Rex, a man might marry his own sister—an act of incest—but be unaware that she is his sister. Since he would be free of guilt, it follows that the act of marrying one’s sister cannot be wrong of itself. Or consider two executioners putting to death two criminals. One does so out of a love of justice, the other out of revenge. The first one has not sinned, while the second has. Therefore, intention determines the evil, not the nature of the action itself. Human Actions Except for the last example (concerning which Aquinas agrees with Abelard; see I-II, 1, 3, ad 3), all of these cases involve a failure to appreciate the nature of human actions, for Abelard’s examples do not involve human acts, but what Aquinas calls acts of a human being. According to Aquinas, a human act is a voluntary and deliberate action (I-II, 1, 1). Driving a...