Living the Good Life

7. Virtue and the Emotions

76 7 Virtue and the e motions Anybody can become angry—that is easy. But to be angry with the right person and to the right degree and at the right time and for the right purpose, and in the right way—that is not within everybody’s power and is not easy. Aristotle Knowing Is Not Doing Ethics is sometimes presented as a series of complicated and difficult choices, for which we must become adept at sophisticated mental techniques. We are asked, “Is capital punishment justified ?” “Should we legalize euthanasia?” “Is abortion morally wrong?” “Should we censor pornography?” Conflicting views are presented on these and other heated issues. Further, we are asked to comment on particular cases. Should Clare blow the whistle on her boss, who has cut some corners and broken some laws, even though she is likely to lose her job as a result? Should Michael be allowed to die from his throat cancer or should he be 77 virTUe anD The emoTions given a lethal injection? And so on. In the end, we are left with the impression that ethics is largely an intellectual endeavor, involving mental gymnastics of the most sophisticated sort that require hours of practice. If we can only straighten out the mess of conflicting values, then we will have done our ethics. The decisions will be reached and the choices made. I don’t want to belittle these questions as if they are insignificant . They have their place. But at best they are only half the story. They leave out much of the ethical life, for when the decision is reached, the choice is not yet made. Nor will it necessarily be made. After Anna decides that she should not embezzle money from her employer she has yet to choose. She might well choose to go ahead and embezzle. Knowing that embezzling is wrong is only half the battle. She must yet choose what is right. Indeed, knowing is the easy part; choosing is the challenge. Most embezzlers report that they knew they were doing wrong, but they did it anyway. By focusing on conflicting opinions, contemporary ethics tends to obscure the role of our affective parts, of both our will and our emotions. It seems to say that we need only worry about sorting out differing values. We need not worry about choosing or about wanting; they will follow as a matter of course. Unfortunately , they will not. When I have determined that I should return the extra twenty, I do not automatically return it. I might well pocket it, especially since I long to have it. Figuring out what I should do is not the difficult matter. Doing it is. And doing follows upon choice, which is influenced by emotions. The true challenge of the moral life, then, is found in our desires, not in our thoughts. We need not strengthen our mental gymnastics so much as we must strengthen our inclination to good. We must develop those habits of desiring and choosing well. 78 virTUe anD The emoTions The full story of ethics, then, must include an account of desiring well. That account is found in Aquinas’s discussion of the virtues, for we desire well by way of the virtues. We are using “desire” in the broad sense, so that it covers the array of our diverse impulses to act. In this sense even anger is a desire; as we will see, we can have the emotion of anger for the right thing, in the right way, and at the right time. We have all heard that patience is a virtue, but many other virtues do not receive the same publicity, for example, generosity , courage, moderation, justice, honesty, and humility. What do we mean when we say that patience, or generosity, or honesty, is a virtue? Certainly we are trying to say something good about patience; we are recommending it to others. A virtue, then, must be something good to have, but so are money and beauty, and these are not virtues, for neither money nor beauty indicates how a person behaves. In contrast, if someone is patient, then we know that he does not get irritable. Similarly, a generous person does not cling to his possessions but gives of them freely; an honest person speaks the truth; a courageous person faces dangers; in general, all virtues indicate some behavior that a person is inclined toward...