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7 Reflections on Medieval Just War Theories A Commentary on Part One gerson moreno-riaño Paritur pax bello Roman proverb A useful place to begin a discussion on the complexities of medieval just war theories is by briefly discussing two other basic ethical positions regarding the morality of armed conflict. It may be the case that medieval just war theories—both ius ad bellum and ius in bello, as well as other variants1 —were created as possible alternatives in part to mediate between the extremes of these two basic positions, namely, political realism and pacifism. My brief opening survey is simply meant to serve as an 117 I would like to thank the academic vice president’s office, Cedarville University, for facilitating this project through a 2001 Faculty Summer Research Grant. Thanks are also due to the excellent staff members of the Centennial Library, Cedarville University, for their assistance in acquiring the needed resources for this project. My thanks also go to Politica: Society for the Study of Medieval Political Thought and PRIO (International Peace Research Institute, Oslo) for facilitating the presentation and publication of this essay. 1. By other variants is meant the attempts by religious scholars, particularly Christian scholars, to justify various types of war and participation in these by religious believers. For example, some variations of just war theories focus more on the types of participation allowed for religious believers than on whether the war itself is just or whether its means are just (problems relating to ius ad bellum and ius in bello). For example, see Hoyt, 1991. Another variation that focuses more on the classical problems of the ends and means of conflict is “preventive war” as articulated in Brown, 1991. ∏ introduction into a discussion about just war theory in the Middle Ages, using insights from the previous essays of this volume as my vehicle. My ultimate aim is to consider some ambiguities within the just war thinking of various medieval figures and to offer a critique of sundry interpretations of medieval just war theories. I hope to demonstrate that several aspects of medieval just war theories are more complex than they seem at first sight and to identify and clarify some of the essential elements on which these theories build. It is my aspiration that in doing so fruitful prospects for new research directions will be raised. Let me add that in offering questions and comments—some of them critical—about the previous essays in this volume, I work from a sense of overall agreement with and respect for these essays. They all offer important contributions to which I hope to add by raising questions for further consideration. The Basic Ethical Positions Regarding War Political Realism One of the oldest arguments justifying the morality of war, albeit not the only one, is that of political realism.2 This, simply and schematically put, is the view that the only ethic that ought to guide and does in fact guide the conduct of a political entity—be it a city-state, empire, or modern state—is concern for that political entity’s self-interest.3 No other arguments —moral or religious—ever hold sway in the affairs of state policy but the keen calculation of how to maximize a state’s “profits.”4 In a 118 Gerson Moreno-Riaño 2. For a good account of both realism and pacifism, see Fotion, 1990. I make use of some of Fotion’s arguments in my exposition of realism and pacifism. My suggestion of “basic positions ” may appear arbitrary to some since it appears to ignore other justificatory accounts such as holy war. However, holy war justifications of war can fit well within the broad parameters of realistic accounts. 3. It should be noted that various types of realism do in fact exist. The definition adopted here is most in harmony with a moral interpretation of strong realism, or the view that holds that states should be guided in their foreign affairs only by a concern for their national interest . There is a nonmoral interpretation of strong realism that argues that morality has no place at all in the behavior of states with each other (see note 4 below for further elaboration). Still, there is another account of realism that defines it as the view that morality is not always pertinent to the conduct of states. For an excellent exposition of these varieties of realism and other surrounding issues, see Mapel, 1996; McMahan, 1996. 4. The way...

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