Democracy and the Ethical Life: A Philosophy of Politics and Community (Second Edition, Expanded)

II. Human Experience and the "Scientific Method"

Human Experience and the "Scientific Method" II The development of an ethical theory of democracy comes up against a number of modern preconceptions about what type of evidence may be accepted by the political scientist. As has already been stated, conscience will be regarded here as an opening to the transcendent purpose of human life. This understanding of conscience forms part of a general view of human nature, according to which man has a spiritual existence , a kind of self-awareness and freedom that is lacking in physical nature and in the animal world. Together with the type of ethical philosophy with which it is indissolubly bound up, that view has come under attack as based on "unscientific ," nonempirical evidence. The last two centuries have seen a vast and increasing amount of activity in the natural sciences. The resulting progress in bringing physical nature under our control has endowed the methods of experimental science with an immense prestige, creating a wish in many quarters for their widest possible application. They have come to be viewed by some as the key to more complete and reliable knowledge, not only of inanimate nature, but of human nature and social life. The distinction between a specifically human, spiritual order, where freedom and responsibility are not only meaningful but unavoidable concepts, and a postulated "quantita27 28 DEMOCRACY AND THE ETHICAL LIFE tive" order of causal relationships has become blurred. Reflecting this general trend, modern political science is marked by a certain reluctance to study politics in the light of a philosophical understanding of man, one which views life from the perspective of actual human self-experience rather than in analogy with what is known pragmatically about physical nature. Many political scientists are prone to evade the difficult question of the special nature of man and its implications for the study of politics and proceed instead according to some version of the acclaimed "scientific method." It is not possible here to state fully the case against making empirico-quantitative methods-and theory, viewed as a set of working hypotheses potentially capable of verification by such methods-the scientific norm for the study of political man. Just enough should be said to show that this approach suffers from grave difficulties. The following attempt to lift the ban on a certain type of evidence and reasoning will have the additional purpose of making the notion of a distinctively human, spiritual nature clearer. It should be noted that I shall be criticizing a tendency in modern political science (and other social sciences) rather than individual intellectual positions , such as may be found among those loosely and often ambiguously described as behavioralists. I am not trying to deny that there are political scientists sometimes said to be in the latter category who, especially in practice, go beyond a dogmatic adherence to empirico-quantitative methods and related types of theory. Needless to say, my argument is not directed against a general concern with finding support in facts for hypotheses. It is difficult to quarrel with the wish to acquire as much knowledge as possible about a subject, provided the subject is not trivial and the collection of information is guided by a sense of proportion. My criticism focuses on the tendency to define "facts" in sociopolitical matters HUMAN EXPERIENCE AND THE "SCIENTIFIC METHOD" 29 with reference to what is so defined in the natural sciences, to assume, in other words, that the nature of man and society does not, in any way essential to a meaningful and reliable understanding of politics, transcend the type of reality which is postulated by the natural sciences. Although often mixed with or counterbalanced by less questionable approaches, this inclination remains a considerable influence. To the extent that social scientists exhibit this tendency, my argument applies; to the extent that they are beginning to question it, it is a reminder of sins past. In the attempt to achieve the closest possible approximation to the principles of natural science in the study of politics , a premium is put on evidence believed to be quantitative or susceptible of quantification. According to one of the pioneers of this modern orientation, Arthur Bentley, the statement of social fact that "takes us farthest along the road toward quantitative estimates will inevitably be the best statement." In Bentley's view, "ideas" and "feelings" are not intelligible social forces but meaningless abstractions. The social scientist should try to eliminate such...