Democracy and the Ethical Life: A Philosophy of Politics and Community (Second Edition, Expanded)

I. Democracy and Man's Moral Predicament

Democracy and Man's Moral Predicament I The prevalent tendency among modern political theorists is to define democracy without reference to a transcendent ethical standard. Democracy is usually treated as a kind of procedural form, neutral in regard to the substance of the popular will. It is viewed as a "method" for making public decisions , a modus procedendi in Joseph Schumpeter's phrase. 1 This form of government, it is argued, does not imply a presumption in favor of any particular set of values beyond that which is necessarily embodied in the rules and rights which constitute democracy. In fact, democracy is sometimes regarded as the form of government which recognizes the impossibility of demonstrating the inherent superiority of one scale of values over another. This view has been succinctly stated by Hans Kelsen: "He who holds that absolute truth and absolute values are beyond human understanding is forced to look upon a' rival alien opinion as possible at the very least. 1 For some variations on this general theme, see Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1950); Henry B. Mayo, An Introduction to Democratic Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960); E. F. M. Durbin, The Politics of Democratic Socialism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1940); David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971); David Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971); Robert Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Anthony Downs, An Economic Interpretation of Democracy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957). 3 4 DEMOCRACY AND THE ETHICAL LIFE Relativism is therefore the Philosophy (Weltanschauung) which the democratic conception presupposes." 2 Without passing moral judgment on anyone, except possibly the antidemocratic , democracy provides the framework for the peaceful settlement of disputes. This type of reasoning about democracy bears a certain resemblance and appears intimately related to the view of political theory which Arnold Brecht calls "scientific value relativism ." 3 According to that doctrine, which incorporates the attempted dichotomy between "facts" and "values," scientific work is ethically neutral. While it is recognized by those who adopt this view that devotion to science and its methods involves some sort of moral commitment, they deny that science as such has any ultimate moral purpose. It is a way of proceeding , a method of inquiry which may serve men with very different values. Political theory proper does not attempt to establish the moral superiority of one scale of values over another, for all scientific claims have to be intelligible to the community of scholars, and we do not have access to an objective , communicable order of values. All we have access to by scientific means, as defined by Brecht, are the subjective preferences of individuals. The similarities between the doctrine of scientific value relativism and much modern democratic theory are thus apparent . Both attempt to separate method from ultimate end. That is not to say that the analogy between the dominant view of democracy and the mentioned conception of science is 2 Hans Kelsen, Allgemeine Staatslehre (Berlin: Springer, 1925),370. Quoted and translated in Rene de Visme Williamson, "The Challenge of Political Relativism ," Journal of Politics, IX (May, 1947), 150. 3 The term "scientific value relativism" is used by Arnold Brecht in Political Theory: The Foundation of Twentieth Century Political Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). The book contains an extensive explication of the doctrine. DEMOCRACY AND MAN'S MORAL PREDICAMENT 5 complete-it is not-only that there appears to be considerable cross-fertilization. It can be said about both that they exhibit a fundamental ambiguity, growing out of a failure to come to grips with basic problems of ethics and logic. Although most academic defenders of the "procedural" view of democracy and scientific value relativism admit that they must ultimately justify their preference for democracy and science by falling back on a value judgment, they claim to ascribe to their systems no overriding purpose or predetermined goal. Among the theorists of democracy, this point is emphatically made by Henry B. Mayo: Democracy sets up no scientifically ascertained "end" for man, has no all-consuming purpose, no Form of the Good, no final ultimate to serve. It has its operating principles and their values; it has the values inherent in the system; and it has a typical character which it both presupposes and promotes. Within these limits a democracy may be used to pursue aims which change...