Aquinas and Analogy

4. Analogous Names

FOUR ANALOGOUS NAMES Whenever Thomas lays out what he means by a word's being analogous, he refers us to univocal and equivocal terms and notes that the analogous term can be located between these two as extremes .! Aristotle's discussion of equivocal and univocal terms at the outset of his Categories provided the point of reference for the discussion of analogous terms. Equivocals "Things are said to be named equivocally when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each."2lt is, of course, the Latin translation of this sentence that influenced Thomas Aquinas. Aequivoca dicuntur quorum solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vera substantiae ratio diversa .3 To be named equivocally is not a property things possess 1. HEt iste modus communitatis medius est inter puram aequivocationem et simplicem univocationem" (ST, la, q. 13, a. 5, c.). 2. Categories, IaI-2. 3. The Latin translation by Boethius continues: " ... ut animal homo et quod 86 ANALOGOUS NAMES independently of our knowing and talking about them. Names attach to things insofar as they are known.4 Doubtless this is why, in the Aristotelian definition, things are said to be equivocal: dicuntur, et non sunt.5 If man with his distinctive mode of knowing did not exist, there would be no equivocal things-that is, things named equivocally. No one would be talking. Things named equivocally are said to have only a name in common ; as soon as we look beyond the shared name, we see diversity. The common term does not signify the same definition in each use. The English translation relies on a loose use of 'definition', something avoided by the Greek Myo~ and Latin ratio.6 A definition in the strict sense, one composed of a proximate genus and specific difference, is not necessarily intended by ratio in the definition of equivocals. If it were, the apparent purpose of speaking first of equivocals and then of univocals would be defeated. Aristotle is preparing to speak of the ten supreme genera of which "being" is said, not univocally, but equivocally. Since the supreme genera cannot have a definition in the strict sense, they could not be said to be named equivocally if ratio had the strict sense. Aristotle's definition begins from things, and these things are said to be equivocal. They are not equivocal in themselves, as things, pingitur. Horum enim solum nomen commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa. Si quis enim assignet quid sit utrumque eorum, quo sint animalia propriam assignabit utriusque rationem." Cf. Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis, PL 64, I63C. 4. On Interpretation, I6a3-4. We have discussed this in the previous chapter. 5. Cf. Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis, PL 64, I64B: "Aequivoca, inquit, dicuntur res scilicet, quae per se ipsas aequivoce non sunt, nisi uno nomine praedicentur : quare quoniam ut aequivoca sint, ex communi vocabulo trahunt, recte ait, aequivoca dicuntur. Non enim sunt aequivoca, sed dicuntur." 6. There is a marked similarity between the various meanings of ratio given by St. Thomas in his commentary on the De divinis nominibus, lect. 5, n. 735, and those given by Boethius. "Ratio quoque multimode dicitur. Est enim ratio animae, et est ratio computandi, est ratio naturae, ipsa nimirum similitudo nascentium, est ratio quae in diffinitionibus vel descriptionibus redditur. Et quoniam generaiissima genera genere carent, individua vero nulla substantiali differentia descrepant, diffinitio vero ex genere et differentia trahitur, neque generalissimorum generum, neque individuorum ulla potest diffinitio reperiri. Subalternorum vero generum, quoniam et differentias habent et genera, diffinitiones esse possunt. At vero quorum diffinitiones reddi nequeunt, ilia tantum descriptionibus terminatur. Descriptio autem est, quae quamlibet rem proprie quadam proprietate designat. Sive ergo diffinitio sit, sive descriptio, utraque rationem substantiae designat" (In Categorias Aristotelis, PL, vol. 64, col. I66A). GMT) 88 PART TWO: ANALOGOUS NAMES but insofar as they are talked of in a certain way.7 Nevertheless, Aristotle is not talking about equivocation but about equivocals, about things named equivocally. The Categories divides things, not as they exist, but as they are known and named by us. That is why it is a logical work. What is categorized is the real; categorization is logical.8 The division is in terms of the different mode of existence (and hence of signification) that things have in our mind. Things are said to be equivocal or univocal because of what happens to them due to our mode of knowing them and talking about them.9 This is the reason for the distinction mentioned by...