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Introduction
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Introduction MICHAEL GORMAN AND JONATHAN J. SANFORD Itisimpossibletothinkwithoutusingcategories.Considerthejudgment thattheroseisred.Tomakethisjudgment,onemustusethecategory “red”andassigntherosetoit;onemustalso,per hapsinasomewhat differentway,makeuseofthecategor y“rose.”Andwhatistrue hereaboutjudgingthattheroseisredis, mutatismutandis, trueabout asserting it,whichmeansthatcategoriesareneededforlanguageas well.Tobesure,thereismoretothinkingthanjudgment,evenasthere ismoretospeakingthanassertion.Butothermentalandspeechacts involve categories:pondering,hoping,intending,asking,ordering, promising,andmanyothers.Withoutcategorieswewould,inshort,be speechlessandthoughtless. Theword“category”comesfromtheGreektermkatagoreuvw, which meanstodenounceoraccusepublicly;itis,inotherwords,toname someattributebelongingtoanindividual,aswhensomeonesaysthat George isathief.AnditwastheGreekphilosopherAristotlewho, buildingontheworkofhispredecessors,inauguratedthesystematic discussionofcategoriesinhisworkofthatname.Laterphilosophers havenotfailedtonoticetheubiquityofcategories,norhavetheyhesi tated toaskquestionsaboutthem.Thepresentvolumeisacollection of essaysoncategories.Beforedescribingtheessaysthemselves,we wouldliketobringoutsomeofthemainissuesincategor ytheory.A convenientwayofdoingsoistoref ectonasimplefact:somethingcan beamemberofmorethanonecategor y.Thisflowe ,forinstance,is notonlyred;itisalsoarose,aphysicalobject,anitemforsale,andso on.Howisthispossible? Onethingthatmakesitpossibleisthatcategoriescanbearranged hierarchically.Everyroseisaphysicalobject,butnotever yphysicalobject isarose.“Physicalobject”isthusacategor ythatincludes“rose”as apropersubcategoryofitself,alongwith“car”and“stone.”Hierarchy vii allowsaparticularflowertobelongnotonlytothecatego y“rose”but alsotoeverycategoryaboveit:flowe ,plant,livingthing,physicalobject ,andsoon.Sothisbringsoutoneimportantissueincategorytheory :hierarchy.1 Theideathatcategoriesarerelatedinthiswaysuggestssomething else,namely,thatperhapsthereisahighestcategoricallevel.And,if thereis,onemightaskwhetherthereisjustonecategoryatthislevel,a categorytowhichabsolutelyeverythingbelongs,orwhetherevenatthe highestlevelthereisstillamultiplicity .Thinkingaboutsuchmatters bringsusimmediatelytoAristotle,whousedtheterm“categor y”torefer tothesehighestsortsofcategoriesandwhoheldtheviewthatthere wasmorethanonecategor yinthissense.Herewefindonetermino logicalissueandahostofsubstantiveones.Theterminologicalissueis simply theneedtokeeptrackofwhentheword“categor y” means “highestcategory”andwhenitmeans“anysortofcategor y.”Thesubstantive issuesbeginwiththerelationbetweenthelowercategoriesand thehighestones:inwhatsensearethehighestonesmostbasic?Ifthe answeristhattheyarebasicinanontologicalormetaphysicalsense, thenonemightwonderabouttheunityofreality:ifthereisnosingle categorythateverythingfallsinto,isrealityultimatelyfragmentary?Or, arethererelationsamongthevariouscategoriesthataresufficientt bringrealityintoaunity? Thesearejustsomeoftheissuesthatarisewhenweusethenotion ofhierarchytounderstandhowsomethingcanbelongtomorethan onecategory.Buthierarchydoesnotalwayshelp.Itcanhappenthat somethingbelongstomorethanonecategor ybutthatthecategories arenotrelatedinahierarchicalway.Theroseisbothaplantandsomething forsale,butnotallplantsareforsale,andnotallthingsforsale areplants.Thesecategories,then,overlap,somethingthathierarchyminded categorizershavetraditionallysoughttoavoid.2 Thinkingabouthowonemightavoidsuchoverlapsraisesfurtheris sues ,eventothepointofcallingintoquestiontheprojectofcategorical metaphysics.Considerthefollowingwayofavoidingtheoverlaps.It istrue,onemightsay,thataroseisbothaplantandanitemfor...