Become Like the Angels

Appendix. The Influence of Origen’s Anthropology on the Greek Patristic Tradition

[269] Appendix The Influence of Origen’s Anthropology on the Greek Patristic Tradition A brief attempt will be made here to trace the influence of Origen ’s anthropology—in particular his distinction between the “mind” (nous) and the “soul” (psychē)—on the Greek patristic tradition . In general, it can be said that Origen’s disciples carry on, faithfully if sometimes overzealously, his doctrine of the soul, while allowing it to be tainted with a dualistic suspicion of the body. This latter element will, in the context of the Origenist disputes of the fourth and fifth centuries, throw Origen’s whole anthropology into disrepute, leading to its condemnation by the Fifth Ecumenical Council at Constantinople. Didymus the Blind, who led Alexandria’s catechetical school for half a century and considered himself a disciple of Origen, echoes his master’s teaching on the soul almost exactly. Didymus carries on Origen’s belief in the preexistence of souls, which—like Origen—he uses to explain the descent of the soul of Christ.1 He also follows Origen in identifying the preexistent soul as a transcendent intellect (nous), “an incorporeal and intelligible essence,” which was made in God’s image and constitutes the very essence of man.2 He similarly holds that, after the fall, the mind is degraded into a soul (psychē), which subsequently serves as an intermediary (meson) between mind 1. See Le Boulluec, “Controverses au sujet,” 224–27. 2. See Commentary on Genesis 57, 7. [270] Appendix and body.3 The quality of a body, for Didymus, is altered to suit its environment, and thus he describes the fallen soul as characterized by a “luminous” and then progressively “dense” body.4 Regrettably, Didymus compromises Origen’s belief in the necessity of embodiment for all creatures, and seems to hold that the preexistent mind was bodiless, a departure from Origen’s thought that will theologically cripple the Origenist tradition and lead to its demise. Evagrius Ponticus, the fourth-century monastic writer, also considered himself a disciple of Origen and claimed to represent his master’s teaching faithfully, and yet a comparison of the theological anthropology of the two figures reveals both similarities and differences . On the one hand, Evagrius seems to echo faithfully Origen’s doctrine of the nous,5 and in particular Origen’s understanding of the “soul” (psychē) as a fallen “mind” (nous), which Evagrius systematizes and articulates even more clearly than Origen. Evagrius gives a central role to Origen’s doctrine of preexistent minds, including but not limited to the mind of Christ.6 Evagrius describes the nous as becoming “thick” upon its descent from God, descending to the level of practical existence, whereby the “soul” emerges as the mind’s “outgrowth”: “The soul is the nous which, due to negligence, has fallen from Unity and which, due to its lack of vigilance, has descended to the level of praktikē.”7 At the same time, the practical, bodily functions of the soul—the imaginations and passions—can become a distraction to the mind, constantly tempting it to betray its noble purpose .8 Both Origen and Evagrius hold in common the twin notions of 3. See Hermann S.Schibli, “Origen, Didymus and the Vehicle of the Soul,” in Origeniana Quinta, ed. Robert J.Daly (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 384. 4. Commentary on Genesis 107, 8. 5. See Bertrand, “L’implication du Nous,” 359. 6. See Le Boulluec, “Controverses au sujet,” 227. 7. Kephalaia Gnostica 3, 28. Note: Michael O’Laughlin believes that on this point Evagrius has betrayed his master and misinterpreted Origen. The present author holds that, at least on this point, Evagrius has echoed Origen’s teaching with great precision. See O’Laughlin, “The Anthropology of Evagrius Ponticus and Its Sources,” in Origen of Alexandria: His World and His Legacy, ed. Charles Kannengiesser and William L.Petersen (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 364–66. 8. See Kephalia Gnostica 2, 48. Henri Crouzel, like O’Laughlin, holds that Evagrius is [271] Appendix the nous, the highest contemplative element in man, and the psychē, or degraded mind. If there are differences in emphasis these are slight: Origen assigns to the nous more the functions of freedom and cognition , Evagrius more the functions of spirituality and prayer.9 Much has been made of the alterations that Evagrius makes to Origen’s tripartite anthropology. As we have already seen, Origen’s anthropology situates the soul...