Plato's Moral Realism: The Discovery of the Presuppositions of Ethics logic of desire: Aquinas on emotion

Appendix A: Republic Book Five: Some Background to Eugenic Theory

271 Appendix A Republic Book Five Some Background to Eugenic Theory I have bracketed out Plato’s discussion of the marriages of the guardians and his associated arguments for eugenic breeding (458d–61e) because a major principle on which this argument depends is confused, not only in this section, but in the Republic as a whole. Indeed, although omitting eugenics from the Republic would apparently leave the guardians with further difficulties in maintaining their ideal constitution, it would still preserve Plato’s admission of a number of qualified women into his governing élite, while at the same time making the dialogue as a whole more coherent. So about which principles is it that Plato is confused or negligent in this section? And what underlying weaknesses of his position have induced him to appear confused? The immediate problem concerns lying and other forms of deception. Plato observes on a number of occasions that deliberate lying is wholly alien to the character of the good man (485c, 490b, 535e) and that the liar is a moral cripple. But there are exceptions where lying is acceptable: lying to enemies is permissible and so, more problematically, is lying to friends to prevent them doing wrong out of madness or ignorance (382c). In the ideal state the guardians are given a good deal of discretion in the matter; they may lie for the benefit of the city in reaction to the behavior of both enemies and citizens. But it is hard not to see circumstances in which such discretion might be “crippling” to their characters, especially if they are deceiving themselves as well as other members of their own 272 caste. And then there is the “noble lie” (perhaps better, “full-blooded and noble piece of fiction,” noble in that it will promote a noble mentality in the guardians), offered by Socrates as desirably believed by all, even the guardians themselves, a “Phoenician story” to be instilled especially into guardian cadets. All are to believe that they have only dreamed of being educated as outlined in the early part of the Republic. In “reality,” this education has taken place underground and at the hands of Mother Earth herself; hence all citizens are brothers (though the “metallic” worth of their souls is different—in the manner of a myth of Hesiod—some being golden, others silver, others iron or bronze). When Socrates asks Glaucon whether he can see any way of inducing people to accept such an outlandish story—which makes one hesitate about taking it seriously rather than treating it simply as an allegory—Glaucon says no, but adds that it might perhaps be possible after the first generation. Socrates quickly passes on to other matters, but even the suggestion that it would be good if, per impossibile, the guardians might be beneficially tricked in this way encourages us to suspect that Plato has inadequately considered the implications of his treatment of lying and falsehood. For what he offers with the “noble lie”—as on occasions when guardians lie for the benefit of their friends—is a surprisingly “consequentialist ” piece of morality that sounds odd in the mouth of a Socrates who is normally the absolute agent-relativist; that is, he holds that not consequences, but the effects on the agent should be the determining factors of action. We recall, of course, that it is Socrates, probably “playfully ,” not the guardians themselves, who proposes the “Phoenician” story. In treating of female guardians, Socrates has not unreasonably appealed to our attitude to animals. When we bring up hunting dogs, we do not assume that because they bear young the females are incapable of hunting. They do indeed have that capacity. But although there is nothing objectionable about proceeding from that to ask whether certain female human beings have the same capacity to rule as a similarly small number of males, the analogy carries the risk that, in other respects too, we may treat animals and humans identically, without looking closely at what each example requires and implies. Thus, when it comes to reproduction it can be assumed that the eugenic practices widely used in Appendix A 273 Appendix A breeding hunting dogs should be applied to humans in order to generate the best new specimens. That implies that there is no special dignity to be attached to the particular human being qua individual, but that, as with animals, we are to regard humans as...