Community and Progress in Kant's Moral Philosophy

Acknowledgments

ix Ack nowledgments I am grateful to many people for their assistance and encouragement during the development of this project. This book began as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Pennsylvania, and I owe the sincerest thanks to the faculty who worked with me on the project, most especially to my thesis advisor, Paul Guyer, whose advice, dedication, and knowledge was a constant source of support and inspiration. Samuel Freeman, Adrienne Martin , and Kok-Chor Tan also provided valuable advice, both with respect to my interpretation of Kant and with respect to its relevance to various critiques of liberalism and contemporary deontological moral theories. Much of the work on this project was made possible by a Charlotte W. Newcombe Doctoral Dissertation fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation during the 2007–2008 academic year. I am very thankful for the time and opportunity afforded to me by this fellowship, both during the fellowship year and in the years since. Several of the chapters in this book were presented as papers at various conferences and meetings over the last several years. I am grateful to the participants at those sessions for their criticisms and comments. In particular, I am grateful to Jennifer Uleman for her comments on what would become chapter 5 at the Central Division meetings of the American Philosophical Association in 2009. I am also grateful to Michael Rohlf and an anonymous reviewer of the first draft of this manuscript. Their comments and criticisms were invaluable to me in refining my argument. x Ack no w l e d g m e n t s Because of their comments, my argument is more nuanced and, I hope, able to speak to even those whose interpretation of Kant differs from mine in important respects. Many of my colleagues at Brandeis University have provided support and commentary on parts of the manuscript. Marion Smiley, Bernard Yack, Jerry Samet, Palle Yourgrau, and Berislav Marusic all aided me in developing my argument, perhaps most of all with their questions about my foundational claims about Kant’s theory of the highest good. I remain convinced that Kant’s theory of the highest good is one of the most important, though most puzzling, aspects of his moral theory. Having colleagues who challenged me to present his theory in clearer terms was especially helpful during my work on this project. I am also grateful to Lauren Leydon-Hardy, who provided invaluable editorial assistance with the manuscript. I have had the great fortune over the years of having dear friends who have provided me with intellectual and moral support . Though the list is long, Susan Mills, Anna Cremaldi, and Krisanna Scheiter deserve a special mention—both for their friendship and for their commentary and criticism of my work. It dawns on me now that all three of these friends have sympathies with Aristotelian ethics, and I am sure that my interpretation of Kant has benefited from this influence. Finally, I owe a special debt of gratitude to my family. My parents, to whom this book is dedicated, were a constant source of encouragement and support. My sister, Rashmi, has always encouraged me to maintain a certain perspective on my work, and I suspect that she has unknowingly encouraged me to embrace Kant’s anthropological observations more than I otherwise might have. My husband, Alex Isbell, has endured many late nights and moments of doubt with an unwavering certainty in the importance of my research. And, of course, our terrier , Lucky, always provided a walk and a wet nose. Community and Progress in Kant’s Moral Philosophy ...